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William W. Berry III* 
Abstract 
In Woodson v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court proscribed 
the use of mandatory death sentences. One year later, in Lockett v. 
Ohio, the Court expanded this principle to hold that defendants in 
capital cases were entitled to “individualized sentencing 
determinations.” The Court’s reasoning in both cases centered on 
the seriousness of the death penalty. Because the death penalty is 
“different” in its seriousness and irrevocability, the Court required 
the sentencing court, whether judge or jury, to assess the 
individualized characteristics of the offender and the offense before 
imposing a sentence. 
In 2012, the Court expanded this Eighth Amendment concept 
to juvenile life-without-parole sentences in Miller v. Alabama. 
Specifically, the Court held that juvenile offenders also were 
unique—in their capacity for rehabilitation and their diminished 
culpability—such that they too deserved individualized sentencing 
determinations. The seriousness of the sentence in question, life 
without parole, also factored into the Court’s decision to extend the 
individualized sentencing requirement to juvenile life without 
parole cases. 
Felony convictions, however, are serious too. The current 
consequences for a felony conviction in most states result in 
dehumanizing effects that extend far beyond release including loss 
of right to vote, state surveillance, and loss of the right to own a 
firearm, not to mention social stigma. As such, this Article argues 
for an extension of the Court’s Eighth Amendment individualized 
sentencing principle to all felony cases. Doing so would require the 
Court to overrule its prior decisions, including Harmelin v. 
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Michigan, but the Court’s opinion in Miller hints at a willingness 
to do just that. 
While initially valuable in ensuring that capital cases received 
heightened scrutiny, the unintentional consequence of the Court’s 
differentness principle is that non-capital cases have received 
almost no constitutional scrutiny. The individualized sentencing 
determination requirement provides one simple way to begin to 
remedy this shortcoming. 
Adopting this doctrinal extension would have three major 
consequences: (1) it would provide each defendant his day in court 
in the face of serious, lifelong deprivations; (2) it would eliminate 
draconian mandatory sentencing practices; and (3) it would shift 
the sentencing determination away from prosecutors back to judges. 
Part I of the Article describes the evolution of the 
individualized sentencing doctrine. Part II exposes the unintended 
consequences of the differentness concept, and unearths the 
theoretical principles behind individualized sentencing. In Part III, 
the Article argues for the expansion of the current doctrine and 
explains why the current roadblocks are not insurmountable. Part 
IV then explores the consequences of broadening the application of 
the individualized sentencing doctrine for defendants, legislators, 
and judges alike. 
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I. Introduction  
Discipline “makes’”individuals; it is the specific technique of a 
power that regards individuals both as objects and as 
instruments of its exercise. It is not a triumphant power . . . it 
is a modest, suspicious power, which functions as a calculated, 
but permanent economy.1  
The Eighth Amendment proscribes “cruel and unusual” 
punishments.2 For all practical purposes, the Supreme Court’s 
application of this provision has simply meant that the Eighth 
Amendment bars only cruel and unusual capital punishments,3 
                                                                                                     
 1. MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 
170 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be 
required, . . . nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 3. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (finding a state 
statute that required the death penalty for persons convicted of first-degree 
murder violated the Eighth amendment); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335 
(1976) (finding that a mandatory death penalty statute violated the Eighth 
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broadened recently to include cruel and unusual punishments 
against juvenile offenders.4 Under the Eighth Amendment, state 
and federal governments may not execute intellectually disabled 
offenders5 or juvenile offenders,6 nor execute offenders for the 
crimes of rape7 or child rape.8 Similarly, state and federal 
governments may not impose juvenile life-without-parole 
sentences for non-homicide crimes.9 
In addition to these categorical limitations, the Supreme 
Court has placed an Eighth Amendment prohibition on the 
implementation of mandatory death sentences10 and mandatory 
juvenile life-without-parole sentences.11 Unlike limits based on the 
kind of offender (juvenile, intellectually disabled)12 or the kind of 
the crime (rape, child rape),13 this limit focuses on the kind of 
sentence—a mandatory one.14  
                                                                                                     
Amendment). 
 4. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (banning life without 
parole sentences for juvenile offenders in non-homicide crimes); Miller v. 
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (banning mandatory juvenile 
life-without-parole sentences). 
 5. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (explaining that 
executing mentally disabled persons would not advance the deterrent or 
retributive purposes of punishment). 
 6. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who 
were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.”). 
 7. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (“[D]eath is indeed a 
disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman.”). 
 8. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446 (2008) (“[T]he death penalty 
is not a proportional punishment for the rape of a child.”). 
 9. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (“A State need not guarantee the offender 
eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her 
with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.”). 
 10. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (finding a state statute that required the 
death penalty for persons convicted of first-degree murder violated the Eighth 
Amendment); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335 (1976) (finding that a mandatory death 
penalty statute violated the Eighth Amendment). 
 11. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 489 (“By requiring that all children convicted of 
homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole . . . the 
mandatory sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of 
proportionality . . . .”). 
 12. See supra notes 5–6. 
 13. See supra notes 7–8. 
 14. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (“North 
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On their face, mandatory sentences serve to ensure that 
judges and juries do not undermine the will of the legislature by 
requiring the imposition of a particular sentence for a particular 
crime.15 In practice, though, statutes with mandatory sentences 
essentially delegate the sentencing decision from judge or jury to 
the prosecutor.16 But as explored below, the Eighth Amendment 
                                                                                                     
Carolina’s mandatory death sentence statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments . . . .”); see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (“[T]he 
mandatory sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of 
proportionality . . . .”). 
 15. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 199, 199–200 (1993) (highlighting “real and important policy 
objectives” of legislatures such as fighting violent crime and drug dealing in 
adopting mandatory sentences). 
 16. See Michael Tonry, Mandatory Penalties, 16 CRIME & JUST. 243, 243 
(1992) (“[M]andatory penalty laws shift power from judges to prosecutors . . . .”); 
see also LOIS G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF 
MANDATORY SENTENCING 3 (1994) (describing an instance during the author’s 
time as a trial judge in which the prosecutor demanded a five year sentence, the 
judge denied the harsh sentence for being unconstitutional, and the appellate 
court remanded to the judge to impose the sentence); Robert E. Scott & William 
J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1965 (1992) (“[W]here 
the legislature drafts broad criminal statutes and then attaches mandatory 
sentences to those statutes, prosecutors have an unchecked opportunity to 
overcharge and generate easy pleas, a form of strategic behavior that exacerbates 
the structural deficiencies endemic to plea bargaining.”); John S. Martin, Jr., Why 
Mandatory Minimums Make No Sense, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
311, 314 (2004) (“Since the power to determine the charge of conviction rests 
exclusively with the prosecution or the eighty-five percent of the cases that do not 
proceed to trial, mandatory minimums transfer sentencing power from the court 
to the prosecution.”); Henry Scott Wallace, Mandatory Minimums and the 
Betrayal of Sentencing Reform: A Legislative Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, 57 FED. 
PROB. 9, 9 (1993) (noting concerns about prosecutors interfering with “the judicial 
role of making individualized sentencing judgments” when mandatory minimums 
are involved); Schulhofer, supra note 15, at 202 (discussing how prosecutors use 
mandatory minimums to induce defendant cooperation). There is extensive 
literature criticizing the use of mandatory sentences, including as part of the War 
on Drugs. See also JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MANDATORY MINIMUM DRUG 
SENTENCES: THROWING AWAY THE KEY OR THE TAXPAYERS’ MONEY? 124–29 (1997) 
(discussing the consequences and costs of applying mandatory minimums to drug 
dealers); Joan Petersilia & Peter W. Greenwood, Mandatory Prison Sentences: 
Their Projected Effects on Crime and Prison Populations, 69 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 604, 615 (1978) (finding that mandatory minimum sentences can 
reduce crime, but they will also increase prison populations). For a discussion on 
public opinion and mandatory sentences, see generally Julian V. Roberts, Public 
Opinion and Mandatory Sentencing: A Review of International Findings, 30 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAV. 483 (2003). 
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limits on the use of mandatory sentences are not simply the 
products of institutional choices.17 Rather, the rights of the 
individual criminal defendant, particularly in the light of serious 
deprivations, inform and substantiate the Eighth Amendment 
limitations on mandatory sentences.18 
It was in Woodson v. North Carolina19 that the Supreme Court 
proscribed the use of mandatory death sentences.20 One year later, 
in Lockett v. Ohio,21 the Court expanded this principle to hold that 
defendants in capital cases were entitled to “individualized 
sentencing determinations.”22 The Court’s reasoning in both cases 
centered on the seriousness of the death penalty.23 Because the 
death penalty is “different” in its seriousness and irrevocability,24 
                                                                                                     
 17. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing how the Eighth Amendment 
and the differentness concept require individualized sentencing in certain 
instances). Note that the academic literature has also widely documented the 
most common effect of adopting mandatory sentences: shifting power from the 
judge and jury to the prosecutor. See supra note 16; see also David Bjerk, Making 
the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion Under Mandatory 
Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L. & ECON. 591, 592 (2005) (stating that mandatory 
minimum laws curtail judicial discretion and shift power to prosecutors); Jeffery 
T. Ulmer et al., Prosecutorial Discretion and the Imposition of Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences, 44 J. RES. CRIME DELINQ. 427, 427 (2007) (discussing the 
“consequent displacement of discretion from judges to prosecutors” resulting from 
mandatory minimum laws); Sonja B. Starr & M.M. Rehavi, Mandatory 
Sentencing and Racial Disparity, Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects 
of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 6 (2013) (explaining prosecutors’ wide discretion to 
charge mandatory minimum offenses and stating that “restricting judicial 
discretion further empowers prosecutors, who tend to exercise that power in ways 
that perpetuate or worsen disparity”).  
 18. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 19. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 20. Id. at 305 (finding a state statute that required the death penalty for 
persons convicted of first-degree murder violated the Eighth amendment). 
 21. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
 22. Id. at 608. 
 23. See id. at 604–05 (stating that the death is qualitatively and profoundly 
different from other penalties); see also Woodson, 428 U.S. at 287 (distinguishing 
the penalty of death as “unique and irreversible”).  
 24. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (discussing the 
consequences of human fallibility in inflicting the death penalty, where “the 
finality of death precludes relief”). Justice Brennan’s concurrence in this case is 
apparently the origin of the Court’s “death is different” capital jurisprudence. See 
id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Death is a unique punishment in the United 
States.”); see also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: 
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the Court required the sentencing court, whether judge or jury,25 
to assess the individualized characteristics of the offender and the 
offense before imposing a sentence.26 
In 2012, the Court expanded27 this Eighth Amendment 
concept to juvenile life-without-parole sentences in Miller v. 
Alabama.28 Specifically, the Court held that juvenile offenders also 
were unique—in their capacity for rehabilitation and their 
diminished culpability—such that they too deserved 
individualized sentencing determinations.29 The seriousness of the 
                                                                                                     
Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 370 (1995) (crediting Justice Brennan as the originator of 
this line of argument); Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and 
the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 118 (2004) (discussing the 
Court’s death is different jurisprudence and requesting additional procedural 
safeguards “when humans play at God”). 
 25. States have generally abolished judicial sentencing in capital cases after 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) and Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
See Carissa Byrne Hessick & William W. Berry III, Sixth Amendment Sentencing 
after Hurst, 66 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 22, 46) 
(explaining that many statutes adopted sentencing systems that limited judicial 
authority and discretion or expanded the right to the jury findings) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 26. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (“[A]n individualized 
decision is essential in capital cases.”); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (“[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity 
underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character 
and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular 
offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the 
penalty of death.”); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333–34 (1976) (criticizing 
a Louisiana law for its lack of meaningful opportunity to consider mitigating 
factors presented by circumstances of a crime or attributes of an offender). 
 27. Prior to Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) and Miller v. Alabama, 
567 U.S. 460 (2012), many had argued that the differentness concept had created 
two completely different sentencing systems—capital and non-capital. See Rachel 
E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional 
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2009) 
(describing the “two-track approach” to sentencing); see also Douglas A. Berman, 
A Capital Waste of Time? Examining the Supreme Court’s “Culture of Death”, 34 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 861, 861 (2008) (distinguishing between capital and non-capital 
sentencing systems).  
 28. See 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (explaining that the statutory requirement 
that juveniles receive lifetime incarceration with possibility of parole violates the 
Eighth Amendment). 
 29. See id. at 478 (stating that the mandatory sentencing scheme disregards 
juveniles’ diminished culpability and the possibility of rehabilitation “even when 
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sentence in question, life-without-parole, also factored into the 
Court’s decision to extend the individualized sentencing 
requirement to juvenile life-without-parole cases.30 
Felony convictions, however, are serious too.31 Currently, 
felony convictions32 in most states result in dehumanizing effects 
that extend far beyond release, including loss of right to vote,33 
government surveillance,34 loss of possession and use of a 
                                                                                                     
the circumstances most suggest it”). 
 30. See id. at 489 (requiring individualized sentencing before imposing “the 
harshest possible penalty for juveniles”). 
 31. See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: 
Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 490 (2010) 
(discussing the consequences of a felony conviction, including “exclusion from 
public or gover nment-assisted housing, employment-related legal barriers, 
ineligibility for public benefits, and felon disenfranchisement”); see also Kathleen 
M. Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National 
Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROB. 10, 10 (1996) (“Upon 
release, incarcerated offenders often encounter barriers to successful 
reintegration involving stigma, loss of job opportunities, friendships, familiar 
relationships, and denial of legal and civil rights.” (citations omitted)). 
 32. There is extensive literature on the growing problem of collateral 
consequences to felony convictions. See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide 
Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: 
Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators”, 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 
673–74 (2008) (noting that collateral consequences have “greatly expanded in 
recent years” and “now apply to relatively minor criminal convictions, and even 
to certain noncriminal convictions”); see also Alec C. Ewald & Marnie 
Smith, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions in American Courts: The 
View from the State Bench, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 145, 145 (2008) (“[P]eople convicted of 
felonies and some misdemeanors in U.S. courts face a number of penalties, 
restriction, and disabilities . . . .”); McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: 
A Criminal Defense Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an 
Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 479, 494–96 (2005) (discussing the collateral 
consequences a felony conviction can have on an offender’s family); Pinard, supra 
note 31, at 461 (stating that collateral consequences affect offenders, their 
families, and their communities). 
 33. See Pinard, supra note 31, at 490 (naming felon disenfranchisement, or 
the exclusion from the right to vote, as a consequence of a conviction); see also 
Ryan S. King, Expanding the Vote: State Felony Dis enfranchisement Reform, 
1997–2008, Sentencing Project (Sept. 1 2008), https://www.sentencing 
projectorg/publications/expanding-the-vote-state-felony-disenfranchisement-
reform-1997-2008/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2018) (providing an overview of the 
various state disenfranchisement laws) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 34. See Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sentencing: The Imposition of 
Federal Supervised Release, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 180, 214 (2013) (naming 
INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING 21 
 
firearm,35 housing consequences,36 employment consequences,37 
and public benefits,38 not to mention social stigma.39 The 
                                                                                                     
surveillance services as a step in the Alabama Board of Pardon and Paroles’ 
mission of rehabilitation). But see Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing 
Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 974 (2013) 
(discussing Sir Joshua Jebb of England’s view that “surveillance would make 
released prisoners second-class citizens and undermine their reintegration”).  
 35. See JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED 
DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS (2008). 
 36. See Corinne A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal Records 
Denied Access to Public Housing, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 566–69 (2005) 
(explaining how public housing agencies’ broad guidelines and policies 
detrimentally affect people with criminal histories); see also Gwen Rubinstein & 
Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and Housing—Denial of Benefits to Drug Offenders, in 
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 
37, 43–46 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (providing an overview 
of the federal housing laws relating to individuals with criminal records). 
 37. See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 112 (2006) 
(stating that men released from prison earn less and are employed less than those 
who have not been incarcerated); Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect 
Class: Towards a Constitutional Framework for Evaluating Occupational 
Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 18, 23 (2005) 
(explaining the effects of online background checks’ increased availability and the 
legal barrier of convicts working in various fields). For an overview of federally 
imposed employment restrictions, see Internal Exile: Collateral Consequences of 
Conviction in Federal Laws and Regulations, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON 
EFFECTIVE CRIM. SANCTIONS (Jan. 2009), https://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/migrated/cecs/internalexile.authcheckdam.pdf. For an overview of 
employment-related restrictions imposed by states, see After Prison: Roadblocks 
to Reentry: A Report on State Legal Barriers Facing People with 
Criminal Records, LEGAL ACTION CTR. (2004), http://216.243.167.66/roadblocks-
to-reentry/upload/lacreport/LAC_PrintReport.pdf. Although slightly outdated at 
this point, the report provides some idea of the variance among the states. 
 38. See Pinard, supra note 31, at 494 (“[S]ince 1996, federal law has denied 
welfare benefits assistance (cash assistance and food stamps) to individuals 
convicted of felony drug offenses.”). For instance, felony drug offenders can lose 
welfare benefits. See 21 U.S.C. § 862a (2012) (denying assistance and benefits to 
individuals convicted of felony drug offenses). States can opt out of this law, and 
some have. See id. § 862a(d)(1)(A) (“A State may . . . exempt any or all individuals 
domiciled in the State . . . .”); see also Smart on Crime: Recommendations for the 
Next Administration and Congress, CONST. PROJECT (Nov. 5, 2008), 
https://constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/62.pdf (proposing 
legislative changes to eliminate the lifetime ban of felons on the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families program and food stamp eligibility). 
 39. See Ted Chiricos et al., The Labeling of Convicted Felons and its 
Consequences for Recidivism, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 547, 548 (2007) (explaining the 
effects labeling can have on a person’s identity and conventional life); Laura M. 
Grossi, Sexual Offenders, Violent Offenders, and Community Reentry: Challenges 
22 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 13 (2019) 
 
consequences typically continue on long after an offender has 
served his or her sentence,40 and warrant closer constitutional 
scrutiny.41 
As such, this Article argues for an extension of the Court’s 
Eighth Amendment sentencing principle to all felony cases.42 
Doing so would require the Court to overrule its prior decisions,43 
                                                                                                     
and Treatment Considerations, 34 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 59, 59 (2017) 
(highlighting the unique social challenges sex offenders face upon release, 
including denied participation in various community events and programs). 
 40. See Carey, supra note 36, at 545 n.1 (explaining that many public 
housing authorities employ one-strike rules to deny housing to people with any 
blemish on their criminal record); see also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 
Third Edition: Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of 
Convicted Persons, AM. BAR ASS’N (2004), https://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_standards_coll
ateralsanctionwithcommentary.authcheckdam.pdf (describing various types 
of long-lasting collateral consequences); Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the 
Hidden Obstacles to Ex-offender Reentry, 45 B.C. L. REV. 255, 258 (2004) (noting 
various collateral consequences that make it “virtually impossible for [offenders] 
to pursue legitimate means of survival”). 
 41. See Pinard, supra note 31, at 462 (advocating for a comparative 
examination of collateral consequences to interpret certain constitutional issues).  
 42. See infra Part III. Others have advocated taking lesser steps in this 
direction in the context of juvenile offenders but not adults. See Lindsey E. 
Krause, One Size Does Not Fit All: The Need for a Complete Abolition of 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Juveniles in Response to Roper, Graham, and 
Miller, 33 L. & INEQ. 481, 483–84 (2015) (advocating to completely abolish 
mandatory minimums for juveniles); see also Alex Dutton, The Next Frontier of 
Juvenile Sentencing Reform: Enforcing Miller’s Individualized Sentencing 
Requirement Beyond the JLWOP Context, 23 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. Rev. 173, 
173 (2013) (encouraging legal advocates to challenge all juvenile mandatory 
minimums through Miller’s analysis). 
 43. The Court has certainly not hesitated to overrule its recent precedents 
in the Eighth Amendment context. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 
(1989) (affirming the death penalty for juveniles), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid 
imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when 
their crimes were committed.”); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) 
(refusing to conclude that the Eighth Amendment precluded execution of 
mentally disabled defendants), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 305, 380 
(2002) (explaining that executing mentally disabled persons would not advance 
the deterrent or retributive purposes of punishment); see also Meghan J. Ryan, 
Does Stare Decisis Apply in the Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Context?, 85 
N.C. L. REV. 847, 848 (2007) (“In recent years, the Supreme Court has steadily 
chipped away at the constitutionality of the death penalty.”). 
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including Harmelin v. Michigan,44 but the Court’s opinion in Miller 
hints at a willingness to do just that.45 
While initially valuable in ensuring that capital cases received 
heightened scrutiny, the unintentional consequence46 of the 
Court’s differentness principle is that non-capital cases have 
received almost no constitutional scrutiny.47 The individualized 
sentencing determination requirement provides one simple way to 
begin to remedy this shortcoming.48 
As explained below, the individualized sentencing 
determination would not only require the elimination of 
mandatory sentences, but also require the consideration of 
                                                                                                     
 44. 501 U.S. 957, 961, 994, 996 (1991) (affirming sentence of 
life-without-parole for first offense of possessing 672 grams of cocaine); see also 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 18, 30–31 (2003) (affirming sentence of 
twenty-five years to life for stealing approximately $1,200 of golf clubs, where 
defendant had four prior felony convictions). 
 45. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (broadening the 
individualized sentencing doctrine to juveniles charged with offenses that carry 
impose lifetime incarceration without parole). 
 46. Criminal law scholar Christopher Slobogin has previously discussed the 
dangerousness of the differentness principle with respect to juvenile offenders. 
See generally Annual Meeting, American Association of Law Schools, Criminal 
Law Panel, in San Diego, Ca. (Jan. 2018). 
 47. Indeed, the Court has seldom held that a non-capital, non-juvenile life 
without parole sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. This is true even where 
the sentence seems particularly excessive. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 
66, 77 (2003) (affirming on habeas review two consecutive sentences of 
twenty-five years to life for stealing approximately $150 of videotapes, where 
defendant had three prior felony convictions); see also Ewing v. California, 538 
U.S. 11, 18, 30–31 (2003) (affirming sentence of twenty-five years to life for 
stealing approximately $1,200 of golf clubs, where defendant had four prior felony 
convictions); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 994, 996 (1991) (affirming 
sentence of life-without-parole for first offense of possessing 672 grams of 
cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370–72 (1982) (per curiam) (affirming two 
consecutive sentences of twenty years for possession with intent to distribute and 
distribution of nine ounces of marijuana); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 
265– 66 (1980) (affirming mandatory life sentence for felony theft of $120.75 by 
false pretenses where defendant had two prior convictions). But see Solem v. 
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279–84 (1983) (reversing sentence of life-without-parole for 
presenting a no account check for $100, where defendant had six prior felony 
convictions); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (holding that removal of 
citizenship is an unconstitutional punishment for desertion); Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) (holding the punishment of cadena temporal 
(hard labor) unconstitutional in light of the offense committed). 
 48. See infra Part III. 
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individualized mitigating circumstances for each offender.49 
Failure to provide this process would violate the Eighth 
Amendment.50 
Adopting this doctrinal extension would have three major 
consequences: (1) it would provide each defendant his day in court 
in the face of serious, lifelong deprivations, (2) it would eliminate 
draconian mandatory sentencing practices, and (3) it would shift 
the sentencing determination away from prosecutors back to 
judges.51 
Part I of the Article describes the evolution of the 
individualized sentencing doctrine. Part II exposes the unintended 
consequences of the differentness concept and unearths the 
theoretical principles behind individualized sentencing. In Part 
III, the Article argues for the expansion of the current doctrine and 
explains why the current roadblocks are not insurmountable. Part 
IV then explores the consequences of broadening the application of 
the individualized sentencing doctrine, for defendants, legislators, 
and judges alike. 
II. The Genesis and Evolution of Individualized Sentencing 
Historically, sentencing practices in the United States 
involved the imposition of indeterminate sentences in both state 
and federal courts.52 Under such sentences, the state would impose 
an open-ended sentence, with a parole board determining when 
release was appropriate.53  
                                                                                                     
 49. See infra Part III. 
 50. See infra Part III. 
 51. See infra Part IV. 
 52. See SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 92 (1980) (“The history of the indeterminate sentence and 
parole can be traced back to the first years of the prison, and even further into 
the history of criminal justice.”); Edward Lindsey, Historical Sketch of the 
Indeterminate Sentence and Parole System, 16 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9 (1925) 
(explaining that the United States employs indeterminate sentencing, commonly 
understood as imposing sentences with maximum limits); Nancy Gertner, A Short 
History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right, 
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 694 (2010) (discussing the creation of the 
complex indeterminate sentencing scheme that began in the nineteenth century). 
 53. See Gertner, supra note 52, at 696 (explaining that parole authorities 
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In the 1970s, though, issues of consistency in sentencing and 
a growing crime rate resulted in the start of a move from 
indeterminate to determinate sentences.54 As part of this shift, the 
purposes of punishment began to shift, at least implicitly, from a 
focus on rehabilitation to approaches favoring retribution and 
incapacitation.55  
Part of this policy shift was a growing adoption of mandatory 
minimum sentences.56 This shift from penal welfarism to penal 
populism, though, was not the first attempt to move in the 
direction of mandatory sentences.57 
In the death penalty context, many states imposed mandatory 
death sentences for conviction of any felony—including murder, 
rape, arson, and robbery—a practice dating from the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution.58 Indeed, the common law practice 
                                                                                                     
had the most power over sentences because they determined when a defendant’s 
conduct merited release). For an extensive discussion of this model of penal 
welfarism and the later shift to penal populism, see generally DAVID GARLAND, 
THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001).  
 54. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 72–73 (2014) (“Principally 
from 1975 to the mid-1980s, the reform movement aimed primarily to make 
sentencing procedures fairer and sentencing outcomes more predictable and 
consistent.”); see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT 
ORDER 87 (1973) (“[T]he power given to a single parole agency may be expected to 
mitigate the disparities in sentencing caused by the unregulated vagaries of 
individual judges.”). 
 55. See GARLAND, supra note 53, at 14 (“[T]he ruling assumption now is that 
‘prison works’—not as a mechanism of reform or rehabilitation, but as a means of 
incapacitation and punishment that satisfies popular political demands for public 
safety and harsh retribution.”). 
 56. See id. at 136 (explaining that many recent politicized policies, such as 
mandatory sentences, are designed to further incapacitation and having offenders 
“taken out of circulation”).  
 57. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 269 
(2002) (explaining that to combat unpredictable jury impositions of the death 
penalty, many states significantly narrowed jury discretion or created mandatory 
death sentences for certain crimes); see also HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN AMERICA 45–47 (rev. ed. 1967) (explaining offenses that carried a 
mandatory death sentence as of 1967).  
 58. See BANNER, supra note 57, at 269 (discussing how North Carolina 
imposed mandatory death sentences on those convicted of first degree murder or 
aggravated rape); see also BEDAU, supra note 57, at 47 (noting additional crimes 
that carried mandatory death sentences in some states, such as treason, perjury 
in a capital case where an execution results, train wrecking that causes death, 
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made death the exclusive and mandatory sentence for these kinds 
of offenses.59  
Juries, however, often elected not to convict murderers rather 
than impose automatic death sentences.60 The initial response of 
states to such jury nullification was to reduce the number of capital 
offenses, with jurisdictions eventually limiting mandatory death 
sentences to first-degree murders, which consisted of willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated killings.61 These reforms, however, 
proved inadequate, as even separating murder into degrees did not 
resolve the difficult mens rea problems of assessing deliberateness, 
willfulness, and premeditation.62 
                                                                                                     
assault on a prison guard, attempt to kill the President, spying in wartime, and 
destruction of vital property in wartime). 
 59. See BEDAU, supra note 57, at 5–6, 15 (discussing the earliest capital 
offenses and the Crown’s mandate that the colonies impose a harsh penal code). 
In England, over 200 offenses warranted death in the late 18th century. See id. 
at 1–2 (“One estimate put the number of capital crimes at 223 as late as 1819.”); 
R. BYE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (1919). The colonies, by 
contrast, had significantly fewer. See id. at 2–3 (explaining that most New 
England colonies made twelve offenses capital); see also Frank E. Hartung, 
Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, 284 ANNALS  AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
8, 10 (1952) (“The English colonies in this country had from ten to eighteen capital 
offenses.”). 
 60. See BEDAU, supra note 57, at 27 (explaining jury discretion); see also 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 290 (1976) (discussing the “not 
infrequent refusal of juries to convict murderers rather than subject them to 
automatic death sentences”); Philip English Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory 
Capital Punishment: An Historical Note, 54 B.U. L. REV. 32, 32 (1974) (“The death 
penalty, many observers claimed, made securing convictions more difficult and 
often resulted in the acquittal of obviously guilty defendants.”). 
 61. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 290 (explaining that many states followed 
Pennsylvania’s practice of confining mandatory death sentences to only murder 
in the first degree convictions); see also BEDAU, supra note 57, at 24 (explaining 
the intent to give the jury an opportunity to exclude less culpable offenders from 
the death penalty by creating varying degrees of murder); David Brion Davis, The 
Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in America, 1787–1861, 63 AM. HIST. 
REV. 23, 26–27 (1957) (discussing Pennsylvania’s unique system to diminish 
death sentences). 
 62. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 290–91 (explaining how the systems failed in 
part due to the “amorphous nature of the controlling concepts of willfulness, 
deliberateness, and premeditation . . . .”); see also McGautha v. California, 402 
U.S. 183, 199 (1971) (“[J]urors on occasion took the law into their own hands in 
cases which were ‘willful, deliberate, and premeditated’ . . . but which 
nevertheless were clearly inappropriate for the death penalty.”), judgment 
vacated by Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941, 941–42 (1972); Andres v. United 
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With juries continuing to nullify murders on a regular basis, 
states began to grant juries sentencing discretion in capital cases 
as an alternative to mandatory death sentences.63 The first states 
to adopt such an approach were Tennessee in 1838, Alabama in 
1841, and Louisiana in 1846.64 By the turn of the century, 
twenty-three states and the federal government had conditioned 
death sentences on jury or judge sentencing determinations, and 
fourteen additional states followed suit by 1920.65 By 1963, all 
states and territories using the death penalty in the United States 
had opted for a discretionary sentencing approach and abandoned 
mandatory death sentences.66 In part because the movement of 
states was away from mandatory death sentences, states never 
challenged the constitutionality of such legislative practices. It was 
not until the late 1970s, when a few states attempted to revive such 
practices, that the Supreme Court addressed the constitutional 
question.67 
                                                                                                     
States, 333 U.S. 740, 753 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing the 
movement against capital punishments and juries efforts to save guilty 
defendants from death); REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, 1949–1953, Cmd. 8932, §§ 27–29 (1953). 
 63. See WILLIAM J. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 7 (1974) (“Further 
discretion in the application of the death penalty was provided by statutes that 
permitted the jury to decide whether convicted first degree offenders deserved 
death or an alternative punishment, usually life imprisonment.”); Woodson, 428 
U.S. at 291–92 (stating that Tennessee, Alabama, and Louisiana were the first 
states to allow discretionary death penalty in 1838, 1841, and 1846 respectively); 
BEDAU, supra note 57, at 27–28 (explaining jury discretion). 
 64. See BOWERS, supra note 63, at 7 (“[T]he first state to make all 
crimes . . . optionally punished by death was Tennessee in 1838, followed by 
Alabama in 1841, and Louisiana in 1846.”). 
 65. See BOWERS, supra note 63, at 8 (providing a table of when and which 
states made capital punishment discretionary for murder). 
 66. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291–92 (explaining that all but eight states had 
adopted discretionary jury sentencing by the end of World War II and that the 
remaining jurisdictions followed by 1963); see also BOWERS, supra note 63, at 7–9 
(discussing the state systems that moved from mandatory to discretionary death 
sentences). 
 67. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (concluding that death sentences imposed 
under North Carolina’s mandatory death sentence statute violated the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) 
(plurality opinion) (concluding that death sentences imposed under Louisiana’s 
mandatory death sentence statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments). 
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A. Capital Individualized Sentencing 
The Eighth Amendment concept of individualized sentencing 
originated with the Supreme Court’s death penalty cases of the 
1970s. In McGautha v. California,68 the Supreme Court considered 
whether the lack of jury guidance in capital cases violated the 
procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.69 Specifically, the constitutional concern related to 
the absence of guidance provided to juries in capital cases.70 The 
Court addressed challenges to both the California and the Ohio 
capital systems in McGautha.71 
In California, the procedural due process challenge related to 
the absence of any guidance or direction for the jury in determining 
whether a first-degree murder warranted a death sentence.72 The 
jury had a sentencing range of no jail time to a death sentence, and 
the court offered no parameters for making that decision.73 
Perhaps even worse than California, Ohio’s capital scheme 
employed a unitary trial for capital cases, meaning that guilt and 
sentencing determinations were made during a single jury 
deliberation.74 This type of system forced the defendant to decide 
whether to fight the issue of guilt and abandon sentencing 
arguments or take the opposite approach.75  
                                                                                                     
 68. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
 69. See id. at 221 (determining that the challenged procedures were 
consistent with those used in most capital trials in the country and did not violate 
petitioner’s constitutional rights), judgment vacated by Crampton v. Ohio, 408 
U.S. 941 (1972). 
 70. See id. at 196 (discussing the claim that “the absence of standards to 
guide the jury’s discretion on the punishment issue” was unconstitutional). 
 71. See id. at 185 (outlining how one petitioner had been convicted of 
first-degree murder and sentenced to death in a California court, the other in an 
Ohio court).  
 72. See id. at 196 (“[P]etitioners contend that to leave the jury completely at 
large to impose or withhold the death penalty as it sees fit is fundamentally 
lawless and therefore violates the basic command of the Fourteenth Amendment 
that no State shall deprive a person of his life without due process of law.”).  
 73. See id. at 190 (instructing the jury that they had absolute discretion to 
determine McGautha’s penalty).  
 74. See id. at 185 (“In Crampton’s case, in accordance with Ohio law, the jury 
determined guilt and punishment after a single trial and in a single verdict.”).  
 75. See id. at 209–10 (discussing a previous Supreme Court case that 
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The Supreme Court rejected both challenges in a narrow 5–4 
decision.76 The Court’s reasoning related to the role of the jury in 
capital cases, finding that nothing in the Constitution prohibited 
delegating the sentencing determination to the “untrammeled 
discretion” of the jury.77 Having documented the long history of 
jury nullification in capital cases where states imposed mandatory 
sentencing procedures, the Court found that allocating wide 
discretion to the jury was vastly preferable.78 In particular, the 
Court was concerned that placing limits upon capital sentencing 
determinations might inhibit the jury from considering facts that 
could or should influence the outcome.79 The Court explained: 
States are entitled to assume that jurors confronted with the 
truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow 
human will act with due regard for the consequences of their 
decision and will consider a variety of factors, many of which 
will have been suggested by the evidence or by the arguments 
of defense counsel. For a court to attempt to catalog the 
appropriate factors in this elusive area could inhibit rather than 
expand the scope of consideration, for no list of circumstances 
would ever be really complete. The infinite variety of cases and 
facets to each case would make general standards either 
meaningless “boiler-plate” or a statement of the obvious that no 
jury would need.80 
While applying the Fourteenth Amendment, this language 
reflects the concern with ensuring consideration of all relevant 
evidence by the capital jury that the Court later adopted with 
                                                                                                     
addressed the issue of the same jury trying both punishment and guilt).  
 76. See id. at 221 (“We have determined that these procedures are consistent 
with the rights to which petitioners were constitutionally entitled, and that their 
trials were entirely fair.”). The bifurcation also related to the privilege of 
self-incrimination, which the Court found was not compromised by the Ohio 
approach. See id. at 217 (“We conclude that the policies of the privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination are not offended when a defendant in a capital case 
yields to the pressure to testify on the issue of punishment at the risk of damaging 
his case on guilt.”).  
 77. Id. at 207.  
 78. See id. at 208 (discussing how seriously jurors will take the responsibility 
of imposing the death penalty).  
 79. See id. (maintaining that listing the factors a juror could take into 
consideration would be a never-ending task). 
 80. Id.  
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respect to the Eighth Amendment.81 Indeed, the Court’s fear that 
legislative rules could unfairly undermine the constitutionality of 
capital sentencing processes became a reality as discussed below 
in Lockett v. Ohio.82 
The Court essentially reversed the substance of its decision in 
McGautha one year later in Furman v. Georgia,83 where the Court 
held that the death penalty, as applied, violated the Eighth 
Amendment.84 Using the Eighth Amendment instead of the 
Fourteenth, the Court’s per curiam opinion simply stated that, as 
currently used, the death penalty was a cruel and unusual 
punishment.85 
Part of the concern of some of the concurring opinions related 
to the absence of guidance for jury determinations in capital 
cases—essentially the same concern raised in McGautha.86 The 
justices though found these issues to be worse than previously 
                                                                                                     
 81. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (identifying 
constitutional shortcomings of North Carolina’s mandatory death sentence 
statute because the jury was not able to judge the “character and record of each 
convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death”); 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (“[W]e conclude that 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the 
rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating 
factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record . . . .”). 
 82. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (highlighting that the death penalty is 
qualitatively different from other sentences, requiring discretion by juries).  
 83. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 84. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam) (“The 
Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these 
cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”).   
 85. See id. (holding that the sentences violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments).  
 86. See id. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he seeds of the present cases 
are in McGautha. Juries . . . have practically untrammeled discretion to let an 
accused live or insist that he die.”); id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) (calling the 
defendant’s sentence “unusual” because juries inconsistently impose death 
sentence); id. at 314 (White, J., concurring) (“[L]egislative judgment . . . loses 
much of its force when viewed in light of the recurring practice of delegating 
sentencing authority to the jury and . . . [the jury] may refuse to impose the death 
penalty no matter what the circumstances of the crime.”); id. at 298 (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (explaining that “virtually all death sentences today are 
discretionarily imposed”). 
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understood.87 Justice Potter Stewart famously likened receiving 
the death penalty to being “struck by lightning,”88 and several 
other justices found its imposition to essentially be arbitrary or 
random.89 Again, the culprit for this wide disparity in outcomes is 
related to the use of juries to sentence offenders convicted of 
death-eligible crimes and the complete lack of direction offered to 
jurors in such cases.90 
In the aftermath of Furman, the states worked quickly to 
amend their capital statutes in hopes of re-establishing the death 
penalty.91 States adopted a wide range of approaches in an attempt 
to assuage the concerns of the five-Justice majority in Furman and 
to comply with the newly discovered requirements of the Eighth 
Amendment.92 
                                                                                                     
 87. Compare supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the complete 
lack of consistency in death penalty sentences), with McGautha, 402 U.S. at 221 
(“The ability of juries, unassisted by standards, to distinguish between those 
defendants for whom the death penalty is appropriate punishment and those for 
whom imprisonment is sufficient is indeed illustrated by the discriminating 
verdict of the jury in McGautha’s case . . . .”).  
 88. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death 
sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning 
is cruel and unusual. . . . [T]he petitioners are among a capriciously selected 
random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.”). 
 89. See id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Eighth 
Amendment . . . was concerned primarily with selective or irregular application 
of harsh penalties and that its aim was to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory 
penalties of a severe nature.”); id. at 277 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The more 
significant function of the [cruel and unusual] Clause, therefore, is to protect 
against the danger of their arbitrary infliction.”). 
 90. See id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“It would seem to be 
incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it 
discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, 
or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such 
prejudices.”); id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“For this Court has held that 
juries may, as they do, make the decision whether to impose a death sentence 
wholly unguided by standards governing that decision.”).  
 91. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 
48 (2007) (“By Furman’s one-year anniversary, twenty states had restored the 
death penalty—and by 1976, that number had grown to thirty-five.”).  
 92. See id. at 57 (pointing out that states adopted mandatory death penalties 
“only because they thought they had to in order to get around Furman”); see also 
LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: 
ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 58 (1992) (explaining that California reacted 
to Furman by amending their state constitution in order to re-instate the death 
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Georgia and other states adopted a system of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances designed to narrow the class of offenders 
eligible for the death penalty.93 Some of these states also adopted 
comparative proportionality review as an additional safeguard, 
providing a process by which the state supreme court would review 
each death sentence to minimize the inconsistency in sentencing 
outcomes by reversing outlier cases.94 
Other states, like North Carolina and Louisiana, decided to 
eliminate jury sentencing discretion altogether by adopting a 
mandatory death penalty statute.95 In these jurisdictions, 
offenders of first-degree murder automatically received a death 
sentence.96 
                                                                                                     
penalty). 
 93. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (“While the jury is 
permitted to consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it must find 
and identify at least one statutory aggravating factor before it may impose a 
penalty of death. In this way the jury’s discretion is channeled.”); William J. 
Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination under Post-Furman 
Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980) (studying arbitrariness and 
discrimination in Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Ohio). Texas adopted its own 
approach that based death sentences on the aggravating concepts of (1) 
intentional murder, (2) future dangerousness, and (3) lack of provocation. See 
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268 (1976) (outlining Texas’ adoption of a new 
capital-sentencing procedure). The Supreme Court upheld this approach under 
the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 276 (“We conclude that Texas’ 
capital- sentencing procedures, like those of Georgia and Florida, do not violate 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
 94. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203 (“[T]he Supreme Court of Georgia . . . reviews 
each death sentence to determine whether it is proportional to other sentences 
imposed for similar crimes.”). For a discussion of how this principle has failed to 
achieve its intended purpose, see William W. Berry III, Practicing 
Proportionality, 64 FLA. L. REV. 687, 718 (2012) (“Were states to adopt a more 
rigorous form of appellate review for death sentences, they could achieve several 
important goals and improve their adjudication of capital cases.”). 
 95. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286–87 (1976) (“North 
Carolina, unlike Florida, Georgia, and Texas, has thus responded to 
the Furman decision by making death the mandatory sentence for all persons 
convicted of first-degree murder.”); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331 (1976) 
(“Louisiana, like North Carolina, has responded to Furman by replacing 
discretionary jury sentencing in capital cases with mandatory death sentences.”).  
 96. See supra note 95 (discussing the adoption of mandatory death penalty 
statutes).  
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Finally, other states delegated the final sentencing decision to 
the judge.97 In some cases, judges had the power to reject or 
override jury verdicts in capital cases.98 
At the end of the Court’s term in the spring of 1976, the Court 
reviewed these new approaches under the Eighth Amendment.99 
The Court upheld the Georgia approach of using aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.100 The three-Justice plurality seemed 
convinced that this approach would narrow the class of offenders 
eligible for the death penalty.101 The opinion also affirmed the 
required weighing of aggravating and circumstances by the jury as 
                                                                                                     
 97. Several states, including Alabama, Delaware, Nebraska, Montana, and 
Florida, adopted this approach after Furman. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & 
William W. Berry III, Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst, 66 UCLA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019). Alabama and Florida used judicial override systems that 
allowed judges to override jury decisions not to impose the death penalty, 
approaches that received much criticism. See, e.g., Michael L. Radelet, Rejecting 
the Jury: The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1409, 1411 (1984) (“The trial judge is responsible for imposing the final life or 
death sentence and is not constrained by either the jury recommendation or 
vote.”). 
 98. Judges can no longer make such override decisions in light of recent 
Supreme Court decisions holding judicial factfinding in capital cases 
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 
609 (2002) (“Accordingly, we overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a 
sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance 
necessary for imposition of the death penalty.”); Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 
624 (2016) (“Florida’s sentencing scheme, which required the judge alone to find 
the existence of an aggravating circumstance, is therefore unconstitutional.”); see 
also Carol Steiker, Things Fall Apart, but the Center Holds: The Supreme Court 
and the Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1486 (2002) (discussing the effect 
of judicial overrides);  Hessick & Berry, supra note 97. 
 99. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207 (affirming Georgia’s statutory approach as 
Constitutional); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (striking down North Carolina’s 
statutory approach as unconstitutional); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336 (striking down 
Louisiana’s statutory approach as unconstitutional); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 
(affirming Texas’ statutory approach as Constitutional); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 
U.S. 242, 259–60 (1976) (affirming Florida’s statutory approach as 
Constitutional). 
 100. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207 (“[W]e hold that the statutory system under 
which Gregg was sentenced to death does not violate the Constitution.”). 
 101. See id. at 196–97 (“Georgia did act . . . to narrow the class of murderers 
subject to capital punishment by specifying 10 statutory aggravating 
circumstances, one of which must be found by the jury to exist beyond a 
reasonable doubt before a death sentence can ever be imposed.”).  
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sufficient enough to eliminate random and arbitrary jury 
sentencing outcomes.102 
By contrast, the Court rejected both the mandatory capital 
sentencing schemes of North Carolina103 (in Woodson v. North 
Carolina) and Louisiana (in Roberts v. Louisiana).104 In Woodson, 
the North Carolina statute at issue imposed a mandatory death 
sentence for first-degree murder.105 The statute defined 
first-degree murder as including premeditated murder, felony 
murder, as well as certain kinds of killings including poisoning, 
lying in wait, starving, and torture.106  
The Woodson court held that mandatory death sentences 
violated the Eighth Amendment.107 Drawing on both McGautha 
and one of the dissenting opinions in Furman,108 the Court first 
                                                                                                     
 102. See id. at 206 (“The provision for appellate review in the Georgia 
capital-sentencing system serves as a check against the random or arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty.”). The presence of comparative proportionality 
review also helped address the concerns of the Justices with respect to potential 
disparities in jury sentencing outcomes. Id. at 203 (stating that “the 
proportionality requirement on review is intended to prevent caprice in the 
decision to inflict the penalty . . . .”). 
 103. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (“For the reasons stated, we conclude that 
the death sentences imposed upon the petitioners under North Carolina’s 
mandatory death sentence statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and therefore must be set aside.”).  
 104. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336 (“Accordingly, we find that the death 
sentence imposed upon the petitioner under Louisiana’s mandatory death 
sentence statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and must be 
set aside.”).  
 105. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286. The complete language of the statute was as 
follows:  
Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment. A murder 
which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, 
imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, 
deliberate and premeditated killing or which shall be committed in the 
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, 
kidnapping, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in 
the first degree and shall be punished with death. All other kinds of 
murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and shall be 
punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than two years nor 
more than life imprisonment in the State’s prison. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Chief Justice Berger’s opinion explained as follows: “I had thought that 
nothing was clearer in history, as we noted in McGautha one year ago, than the 
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reasoned that mandatory death sentences were inconsistent with 
the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”109 This was because states had largely 
abandoned the practice of mandatory death sentences, and the 
only reason that North Carolina adopted its statute was to satisfy 
the Court’s decision in Furman.110 In other words, mandatory 
death sentences were unusual punishments.111 
Second, the Court explained that North Carolina’s statute did 
not solve the problem of unbridled jury discretion raised in 
Furman; it merely “papered over” the issue by adopting a 
mandatory death sentence for first-degree murders.112 From the 
Court’s perspective, allowing juries to determine guilt under a 
mandatory death statute made jury nullification likely, which 
created the same kind of arbitrary and random outcomes that 
result from jury sentencing in capital cases.113 
The third constitutional shortcoming of North Carolina’s 
statute forms the basis for the doctrine that is the focus of this 
Article—individualized sentencing.114 The Court explained this 
shortcoming as the “failure to allow the particularized 
consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of 
                                                                                                     
American abhorrence of ‘the common law rule imposing a mandatory death 
sentence on all convicted murderers.’” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402 
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).   
 109. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (quoting Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).  
 110. See id. at 298–99 (“The fact that some States have adopted mandatory 
measures following Furman while others have legislated standards to guide jury 
discretion appears attributable to diverse readings of this Court’s multi-opinioned 
decision in that case.”). 
 111. See William W. Berry III, Promulgating Proportionality, 46 GA. L. REV. 
69, 113 (2011) (“As he indicated in Furman, Justice White believed that the 
constitutional flaw of the then-existing death penalty statutes was not 
randomness, but underutilization. To him, what made a particular death 
sentence cruel and unusual was the rarity of similar cases receiving the same 
sentence.”).  
 112. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302. 
 113. See id. at 302–03 (stating that a mandatory death penalty statute “does 
not fulfill Furman’s basic requirement by replacing arbitrary and wanton jury 
discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally 
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death”).  
 114. See id. at 303–05 (finding that individualized sentencing is required 
under the constitution when inflicting the penalty of death).   
36 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 13 (2019) 
 
each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a 
sentence of death.”115 This means that, at least in the capital 
context, the Eighth Amendment requires states to use a process 
that accords “significance to relevant facets of the character and 
record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the 
particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the 
ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or 
mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of 
humankind.”116 
What made the lack of individualized consideration so 
objectionable to the Court in Woodson was its consequence—the 
mandatory death penalty results in the execution of the criminal 
offender.117 As the Court emphasized, the North Carolina 
mandatory death penalty statute treated “all persons convicted of 
a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but 
as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to 
the blind infliction of the penalty of death.”118 
The Court concluded by limiting the constitutional scope of its 
Eighth Amendment individualized sentencing approach to capital 
cases, even while acknowledging that such an approach 
constituted “enlightened policy.”119 To be clear, the Court in 
Woodson opined that the “fundamental respect for humanity 
underlying the Eighth Amendment” made individualized 
sentencing a “constitutionally indispensable part of the process of 
inflicting the penalty of death.”120 
In Roberts v. Louisiana, decided the same day as Woodson, the 
Court likewise barred the use of mandatory death sentences in 
holding that Louisiana’s statute121 violated the Eighth 
                                                                                                     
 115. Id. at 303. 
 116. Id. at 304. 
 117. See id. at 305 (“Because of that qualitative difference, there is a 
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that 
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”).  
 118. Id. at 304.  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:30 (1974). The statute provided: 
First degree murder is the killing of a human being: 
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great 
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Amendment.122 The Louisiana mandatory death penalty statute 
was narrower than the North Carolina statute in two ways—it 
limited the kinds of murder that counted as first-degree murder123 
and it provided more guidance to the jury about lesser-included 
offenses.124  
                                                                                                     
bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted 
perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape or armed 
robbery; or 
(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great 
bodily harm upon, a fireman or a peace officer who was engaged in the 
performance of his lawful duties; or 
(3) When the offender has a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great 
bodily harm and has previously been convicted of an unrelated murder 
or is serving a life sentence; or 
(4)  When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great 
bodily harm upon more than one person; [or] 
(5) When the offender has specific intent to commit murder and has 
been offered or has received anything of value for committing the 
murder. 
For the purposes of Paragraph (2) herein, the term peace officer shall 
be defined any include any constable, sheriff, deputy sheriff, local or 
state policeman, game warden federal law enforcement officer, jail or 
prison guard, parole officer, probation officer, judge, district attorney, 
assistant district attorney or district attorneys’ investigator. 
Whoever commits the crime of first degree murder shall be punished 
by death. 
 122. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (“Accordingly, we find 
that the death sentence imposed upon the petitioner under Louisiana’s 
mandatory death sentence statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and must be set aside.”). 
 123. Id. at 332. The Louisiana statute had only five categories of homicide 
that constituted first degree murder:  
[K]illing in connection with the commission of certain felonies; killing 
of a fireman or a peace officer in the performance of his duties; killing 
for remuneration; killing with the intent to inflict harm on more than 
one person; and killing by a person with a prior murder conviction or 
under a current life sentence.  
Id. Unlike North Carolina, the Louisiana statute did not have broad categories of 
felony murder or premeditated murder in its definition of first-degree murder. Id. 
at 332 (discussing the narrowness of the Louisiana statute’s first-degree murder 
definition as compared to the North Carolina statute).  
 124. See id. at 332 (requiring judges to instruct juries on lesser crimes); see 
also LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., §§ art. 809, 814 (Supp. 1975) (listing responsive 
verdicts that the judge should instruct to the jury); State v. Cooley,257 So. 2d 400, 
401 (1972) (discussing how “manslaughter was made a lesser included offense to 
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Nonetheless, the Court found that the differences were not 
material.125 Mandatory capital statutes, even if narrow, still 
violate the Eighth Amendment.126 The Court explained,  
[t]he futility of attempting to solve the problems of mandatory 
death penalty statutes by narrowing the scope of the capital 
offense stems from our society’s rejection of the belief that 
“every offense in alike legal category calls for an identical 
punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a 
particular offender.”127  
In reaffirming its decision in Woodson, the Court emphasized that 
Louisiana’s statute did not eliminate the “constitutional vice” of 
mandatory death statutes: the “lack of focus on the circumstances 
of the particular offense and the character and propensities of the 
offender.”128 
The Court expanded the individualized sentencing doctrine 
two years later in Lockett v. Ohio.129 The issue in Lockett was 
whether Ohio’s statute violated the rule from Woodson by 
restricting mitigating evidence at capital sentencing.130 
Specifically, the Ohio capital statute limited mitigation at 
sentencing to situations where (1) the victim induced the offense, 
(2) the offense was committed under duress or coercion, or (3) the 
offense was the product of mental deficiencies.131 By limiting the 
                                                                                                     
the charge of murder”). 
 125. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 332 (“That Louisiana has adopted a different 
and somewhat narrower definition of first-degree murder than North Carolina is 
not of controlling constitutional significance.”). 
 126. See id. (“The history of mandatory death penalty statutes indicates a 
firm societal view that limiting the scope of capital murder is an inadequate 
response to the harshness and inflexibility of a mandatory death sentence 
statute.”).  
 127. Id. at 333 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978) (“The Ohio death penalty statute does not 
permit the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors we now hold 
to be required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases.”). 
 130. Id. at 589. The facts of Lockett were particularly egregious. Sandra 
Lockett received a death sentence for agreeing to serve as the getaway driver for 
a robbery. Id. at 589–94. She had no reason to believe that the other offenders 
would kill, no intent to kill, and took no part in the actual killing. Id. 
 131. Id. at 593–94; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03–2929.04(B) (1975). 
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available mitigating evidence, the statute essentially made an 
aggravated murder conviction a mandatory death sentence for 
offenders who did not exhibit the statutorily enumerated kinds of 
mitigating evidence.132 
The Court held that the Ohio statute violated the Eighth 
Amendment.133 It cited its prior finding from Woodson that the 
Eighth Amendment required assessment of “character and record 
of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular 
offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of 
inflicting the penalty of death.”134 This concept, the Court 
emphasized, comes from “the fundamental respect for humanity 
underlying the Eighth Amendment.”135 
The statute’s shortcoming was the limitation it placed on 
mitigating factors at sentencing.136 It limited the consideration of 
mitigation evidence only to the enumerated mitigating factors and 
did not allow the court to consider other mitigating factors.137 
The Court explained that the sentencing judge having 
“‘possession of the fullest information possible concerning the 
defendant’s life and characteristics’ is ‘[h]ighly relevant—if not 
essential—[to the] selection of an appropriate sentence . . . .’”138 
Under the Eighth Amendment, this included all relevant 
mitigating evidence.139 
                                                                                                     
 132. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 594 (“[T]he judge said that he had ‘no alternative, 
whether [he] like[d] the law or not’ but to impose the death penalty. He then 
sentenced Lockett to death.”). 
 133. See id. at 604 (stating that the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments 
require that the sentencer be allowed to consider all mitigating factors proffered 
by the defendant in “all but the rarest” capital cases). 
 134. Id. at 601 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)). 
 135. Id. at 604 (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304). 
 136. See id. at 606 (“The Ohio death penalty statute does not permit the type 
of individualized consideration of mitigating factors we now hold to be required 
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases.”). 
 137. See id. at 608–09 (“To meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty 
statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors.”). It was 
not the listing of the factors per se, but the limitation on using non-listed factors 
that created the constitutional problem. Id. 
 138. Id. at 603 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247–48 (1949)). 
 139. See id. at 607–09 (“To meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty 
statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors.”). 
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In deciding Lockett, the Court again emphasized its 
differentness principle, concluding that the nature of the death 
penalty made the individualized sentencing protection important 
in a way that did not extend to non-capital cases.140 The Court 
focused on the variety of post-trial techniques available to modify 
the imposition of the sentence in non-capital cases, such as parole, 
probation, and work furloughs, that in its mind, minimized the 
comparative seriousness of non-capital sentences.141 
The Court again applied the Woodson-Lockett individualized 
sentencing rule in Eddings v. Oklahoma.142 In Eddings, the trial 
judge considered the relevant aggravating evidence at 
sentencing,143 but refused to consider the defendant’s mitigating 
evidence, aside from his youth.144 Specifically, Eddings had 
attempted to put on evidence of his family history of abuse as well 
as his severe psychological and emotional disorders.145 
                                                                                                     
 140. See id. at 605 (“The need for treating each defendant in a capital case 
with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more 
important than in noncapital cases.”). 
 141. See id. (“The nonavailability of corrective or modifying mechanisms with 
respect to an executed capital sentence underscores the need for individualized 
consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence.”). 
 142. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (“By holding that the 
sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating 
factor, the rule in Lockett recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring 
individual differences is a false consistency.”). 
 143. See id. at 108–09 (“At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge 
weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. He found that 
the State had proved each of the three alleged aggravating circumstances beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”). Eddings had murdered a police officer, which certainly 
made the death penalty a more likely punishment. Id. at 105–06. 
 144. See id. at 108 (“Turning to the evidence of mitigating circumstances, the 
judge found that Eddings’ youth was a mitigating factor of great weight: ‘I have 
given very serious consideration to the youth of the Defendant when this 
particular crime was committed.’”). Eddings was age 16 at the time of the crime. 
Id. at 105. Death sentences would later be prohibited for juvenile offenders under 
the Eighth Amendment. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (“The 
age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between 
childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death 
eligibility ought to rest.”). 
 145. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 109–10. In rejecting this evidence on appeal, the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals explained: 
Eddings also argues his mental state at the time of the murder. He 
stresses his family history in saying he was suffering from severe 
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In assessing the decision by the trial judge to exclude 
mitigating evidence at sentencing, the Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment barred Eddings’ death sentence.146 The Court 
explained, “[j]ust as the State may not by statute preclude the 
sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the 
sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant 
mitigating evidence.”147 It further found that, in light of the age of 
the defendant (age 16), evidence of Eddings’ childhood was very 
relevant.148 The Court concluded, “there can be no doubt that 
evidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings by a harsh 
father, and of severe emotional disturbance is particularly 
relevant.”149 
In Smith v. Texas,150 the Texas trial court gave a nullification 
instruction with respect to mitigating evidence in a death 
sentencing proceeding.151 The instruction limited the court’s 
consideration of mitigation evidence to the nullification of the two 
“special issue” aggravating factors under the Texas statute: 
(1) whether the offender committed the murder deliberately; and 
(2) whether the offender constituted a future danger to society 
such that he would kill again.152 In other words, the mitigating 
evidence could only be considered to the degree to which it bore on 
                                                                                                     
psychological and emotional disorders, and that the killing was in 
actuality an inevitable product of the way he was raised. There is no 
doubt that the petitioner has a personality disorder. But all the 
evidence tends to show that he knew the difference between right and 
wrong at the time he pulled the trigger, and that is the test of criminal 
responsibility in this State. For the same reason, the petitioner’s 
family history is useful in explaining why he behaved the way he did, 
but it does not excuse his behavior. 
 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 616 P.2d 1159, 1170 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980). 
 146. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113 (“We find that the limitations placed by 
these courts upon the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule 
in Lockett.”). 
 147. Id. at 113–14. 
 148. See id. at 115–16 (“Our history is replete with laws and judicial 
recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less 
mature and responsible than adults.”). 
 149. Id. at 115. 
 150. 543 U.S. 37 (2004). 
 151. Id. at 37. 
 152. Id. at 39. 
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the required determinations of deliberateness or dangerousness. 
Smith’s mitigating evidence dealt with his intellectual disabilities, 
including a low IQ, as well as his family background.153 
The Court applied Lockett and held that the nullification 
instruction violated the Eighth Amendment.154 Specifically, the 
Court explained, “the key . . . is that the jury be able to ‘consider 
and give effect to [a defendant’s mitigation] evidence in imposing 
[a] sentence.’”155 
By contrast, the Court later explained that the individualized 
sentencing consideration requirement under the Eighth 
Amendment does not bear on the weighing process of aggravating 
and mitigating factors in the case of Kansas v. Marsh.156 In Marsh, 
the Court upheld Kansas’ sentencing process that instructed the 
jury to choose death unless the mitigating evidence outweighed the 
aggravating evidence.157 Because the procedure allowed for the full 
and complete consideration of mitigating evidence, it did not 
violate the principle adopted in Woodson and Lockett.158  
Finally, it is worth noting that the Woodson-Lockett principle 
may, in some senses, conflict with the general principle established 
by Furman of requiring limits on discretion to minimize random 
and arbitrary sentences.159 The individualized sentencing principle 
                                                                                                     
 153. See id. at 41 (noting that the defendant had a total I.Q. of 75, his father 
was a drug addict regularly involved with gang violence, and that defendant was 
only nineteen when he committed the crime).  
 154. Id. at 48–49. 
 155. Id. at 46 (quoting Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001)). 
 156. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 171 (2006) (“[W]hile the Constitution 
requires that a sentencing jury have discretion, it does not mandate that 
discretion be unfettered; the States are free to determine the manner in which a 
jury may consider mitigating evidence.”). 
 157. See id. at 173 (“Kansas’ death penalty statute, consistent with the 
Constitution, may direct imposition of the death penalty when the State has 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that mitigators do not outweigh aggravators, 
including where the aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances are 
in equipoise.”). 
 158. See id. at 175 (“[O]ur precedents confer upon defendants the right to 
present sentencers with information relevant to the sentencing decision and 
oblige sentencers to consider that information in determining the appropriate 
sentence. The thrust of our mitigation jurisprudence ends here.”). 
 159. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656–74 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he Lockett rule represents a sheer ‘about-face’ from Furman, an 
outright negation of the principle of guided discretion that brought us down the 
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requires consideration of all relevant evidence; the Furman 
principle requires some level of consistency in decision-making.160 
Proportionality review, however, provides one answer to this 
doctrinal conundrum.161 State supreme courts can remedy 
arbitrary or random outcomes by excluding outlier cases, while 
still allowing juries to consider mitigating evidence.162 Another 
way of understanding this idea relates to the degree to which two 
cases are in fact similar such that a disparate sentencing outcome 
would constitute disparity.163 Using broad categories of similarity, 
like aggravating factors in capital cases or some crimes more 
generally, may not really capture fundamental differences that 
ought to bear on the sentencing outcome.164  
B. Juvenile Individualized Sentencing 
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court opened the door to 
applying the Eighth Amendment in a more robust way to 
non-capital cases.165 Specifically, the Court decided Graham v. 
                                                                                                     
path of regulating capital sentencing procedure in the first place.”). 
 160. See id. (noting the fundamental tension between the two requirements 
and the difficulties faced by many states trying to rectify the two standards). 
 161. See Berry, supra note 111, at 74 (“[P]roportionality unites the two 
competing lines of cases by conceptualizing the Eighth Amendment to require 
that states meet both the demands of relative proportionality . . . and absolute 
proportionality—which incorporates the need for case-specific review . . . .”). 
 162. See id. at 96 (“Whatever consistency is lost by allowing juries to consider 
specific facts in individual sentencing determinations is recaptured by the 
appellate court reviewing the case for relative proportionality, thereby protecting 
against any outlier death verdicts.”). 
 163. See Berry, supra note 94, at 712 (“The model proposed here advocates 
using the purposes of punishment—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation—as the tool for defining similarity. In other words, similar cases 
would be those that achieve the same punitive goal.”). 
 164. See id. at 702 (“An examination of the effect of aggravating factors on a 
statutory sentencing scheme demonstrates that the purported safeguard created 
by the factors is currently inadequate to achieve its intended purpose.”). 
 165. See Barkow, supra note 27, at 1145 (noting the longstanding discrepancy 
between the Supreme Court’s robust review of capital cases and the substantially 
less intensive review of non-capital cases); William W. Berry III, More Different 
than Life, Less Different than Death, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109, 1109 (2010) (arguing 
that the Graham decision did not diminish the “differentness” of death cases, but 
rather opened the door for reexamining certain non-capital cases, such as life 
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Florida,166 where it proscribed life without parole sentences for 
juvenile offenders in non-homicide crimes.167 This decision 
broadened the concept of differentness to juvenile life without 
parole.168 Two years later, in Miller v. Alabama, the Court applied 
the Graham decision to mandatory juvenile life without parole 
sentences, broadening the individualized sentencing doctrine that 
originated in Woodson and Lockett.169  
At the time of Miller, a number of states imposed mandatory 
life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders.170 In many 
cases, these sentencing schemes were not the original legislative 
design.171 Two major developments shaped the rise of juvenile life 
                                                                                                     
without parole).  
 166. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 167. See id. at 79 (“The State has denied him any chance to later demonstrate 
that he is fit to rejoin society based solely on a nonhomicide crime that he 
committed while he was a child in the eyes of the law. This the Eighth 
Amendment does not permit.”). 
 168. Id. at 75 (“The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that 
persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain 
behind bars for life. It does prohibit States from making the judgment at the 
outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.”). At the time the 
Court decided Graham, it was unclear whether the decision meant that life 
without parole sentences were different or juvenile offenders were different. The 
Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) pointed to the latter. 
Accord William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment Differentness, 78 MO. L. REV. 
1053, 1055 (2013) (arguing that the Miller decision provides a “roadmap” for 
broadening the power of the eighth amendment); Berry, supra note 165, at 1109 
(arguing that life without parole sentences are also “different” from other 
sentences in the same way that the death sentence is different.). 
 169. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (“[T]he Eighth 
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without 
possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”). 
 170. See William W. Berry III, The Mandate of Miller, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
327, 336 (2014) (discussing Miller and providing context). 
 171. See William W. Berry III, Life-with-Hope Sentencing: The Argument for 
Replacing Life-Without-Parole Sentencing with Presumptive Life Sentences, 76 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1055 (2015) (“As with many problems in our legal system, the 
LWOP epidemic resulted from a confluence of different events. It certainly is not 
the product of any intentional or thoughtful legislative design.”). 
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without parole sentences—the abolition of parole172 and the 
abolition of the juvenile death penalty.173  
In the 1970s, many states began abolishing parole, 
particularly for more serious crimes like murder.174 This 
“truth in sentencing” movement eschewed the concept of 
rehabilitation in favor of retribution and incapacitation.175 The 
penal populism movement sought not to reform the offender, but 
instead protect society from the offender.176 Many crimes that 
previously carried life with parole sentences thus became life 
without parole sentences because parole was no longer an 
option.177 This meant that sentences that were formerly fifteen 
years in length, as a practical matter, essentially became life 
sentences.178 
Then, in 2005, the Supreme Court held that juvenile death 
sentences violated the Eighth Amendment in Roper v. Simmons.179 
                                                                                                     
 172. See, e.g., Robert P. Crouch, Jr., Uncertain Guideposts on the Road to 
Criminal Justice Reform: Parole Abolition and Truth-in-Sentencing, 2 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 419, 419 (1994) (“The federal abolition of parole and the imposition of 
mandatory minimum sentences have provided the government with a ‘heavier 
hammer’ to wield in prosecutions, but with uncertain results.”). 
 173. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (“The age of 18 is the 
point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and 
adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought 
to rest.”).  
 174. See Crouch, supra note 172, at 419 (noting the movement by states to 
abolish parole and the potential resulting impacts). 
 175. Crouch, supra note 172, at 423 (“Much of the impulse driving parole 
abolition and truth-in-sentencing is, rightly, the public demand that those who 
break the law be held accountable for their actions.”); GARLAND, supra note 53, 
 176. GARLAND, supra note 53; see generally JOHN PRATT, PENAL POPULISM 
(2007). 
 177. See Berry, supra note 171, at 1060 (“By 2000, sixteen states had 
abolished discretionary parole for all crimes.”). 
 178. See id. (“Prior to the move towards penal populism, a life sentence often 
meant that an offender served between fifteen and twenty years with the 
possibility of parole after that time. By abolishing parole, states turned these 
sentences into LWOP sentences.”); Crouch, supra note 172, at 421 (“[I]t is certain 
that defendants who are convicted or accept plea agreements will serve more time 
than before because there is no parole. The abolition of parole guarantees that 
prisoners will serve their entire sentences without early release for considerations 
such as good behavior or overcrowding.”). 
 179. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (“The age of 18 is the point where society draws 
the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, 
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The effect of this decision was to commute juvenile death sentences 
to juvenile life without parole sentences.180 It also made juvenile 
life without parole sentences the most severe sentence in juvenile 
murder cases, moving some possible death sentences to life 
without parole sentences.181 
In Miller, the Court considered whether mandatory juvenile 
life without parole sentences violated the Eighth Amendment.182 
Relying on the Woodson-Lockett concept of individualized 
sentencing183 and the Roper-Graham idea that juveniles are 
different,184 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment requires a 
sentencing determination by a judge or jury before sentencing a 
juvenile offender to life without parole.185 
With respect to the concept of individualized sentencing, the 
Court was particularly concerned that mandatory juvenile life 
without parole sentences “preclude a sentencer from taking 
account of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and 
                                                                                                     
the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.”). 
 180. See Hilary J. Massey, Disposing of Children: The Eighth 
Amendment and Juvenile Life Without Parole After Roper, 47 B.C. L. REV. 1083, 
1083–84 (2006) (“Today, children are not only transferred to and prosecuted in 
the adult system more readily than before the 1990s, but also are sentenced to its 
penultimate penalty—life without the possibility of parole.”). 
 181. It also raised the question concerning whether the Court should do the 
same for juvenile accomplices. See Brian R. Gallini, Equal Sentences for Unequal 
Participation: Should the Eighth Amendment Allow All Juvenile Murder 
Accomplices to Receive Life without Parole?, 87 OR. L. REV. 29, 30–31 (2008) 
(arguing that the current Supreme Court jurisprudence provides inadequate 
guidance to lower courts sentencing nonkiller juveniles convicted of murder).  
 182. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2013) (“We therefore hold that the 
Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison 
without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”). 
 183. See discussion supra Part I.A (discussing how the Supreme Court has 
expanded interpretations of the Eighth Amendment to prohibit mandatory death 
sentences and statutory preclusion of mitigatory factors). 
 184. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (“Roper and Graham establish that children 
are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Because 
juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, we 
explained, ‘they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.’”).  
 185. See id. at 479 (“We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a 
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders.”). 
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circumstances attendant to it.”186 The consideration of such 
characteristics was paramount precisely because the mandatory 
sentence would not allow the Court to take into account what often 
amounts to clear and significant differences between adult and 
juvenile offenders.187 
Two years after Miller, the Court revisited this issue in 
Montgomery v. Louisiana188 in which it considered whether the 
decision in Miller applied retroactively.189 Under the Court’s 
retroactivity doctrine, the core question was whether the holding 
in Miller, which proscribed the imposition of mandatory juvenile 
life without parole sentences, constituted a substantive rule or a 
procedural rule.190 Under Teague v. Lane,191 new substantive rules 
of constitutional law apply retroactively, which new procedural 
rules generally do not.192 
                                                                                                     
 186. Id. at 476. 
 187. See id. (describing youth as a time of immaturity and irresponsibility, 
but that these “signature qualities” are all “transient”). As the Court stated:  
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of 
his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, 
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home 
environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually 
extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects 
the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his 
participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures 
may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been 
charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies 
associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police 
officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity 
to assist his own attorneys. 
Id. at 477–78. 
 188. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
 189. See id. at 725 (“In the wake of Miller, the question has arisen whether 
its holding is retroactive to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences 
were final when Miller was decided.”). 
 190. See id. at 732 (contrasting procedural rules, which regulate only “the 
manner of determining the defendant’s culpability,” with substantive rules that 
forbid “criminal punishment of certain primary conduct”). 
 191. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 192. See id. at 310 (“Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, 
new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases 
which have become final before the new rules are announced.”). For an argument 
concerning how the Court should improve its doctrine, see William W. Berry III, 
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The Court held that the Miller rule was substantive for 
retroactivity purposes, and applied to pre-Miller juvenile life 
without parole sentences.193 Importantly, the Court gave guidance 
on when a judge should sentence a juvenile offender to life without 
parole.194 The Court explained: 
Miller requires that before sentencing a juvenile to life without 
parole, the sentencing judge take into account “how children are 
different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably 
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” The Court recognized 
that a sentencer might encounter the rare juvenile offender who 
exhibits such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is 
impossible and life without parole is justified. But in light of 
“children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for 
change,” Miller made clear that “appropriate occasions for 
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be 
uncommon.”195 
The importance of this decision for the Woodson-Lockett doctrine 
rests in the requirement that a sentencer give full and fair 
consideration to mitigating evidence.196 As the Court held, this is a 
substantive consideration. It requires more than a court simply 
allowing the offender to present mitigating evidence; it requires a 
court to actively consider such evidence.197 The Court explained as 
follows: “Miller, then, did more than require a sentencer to 
consider a juvenile offender’s youth before imposing life without 
parole; it established that the penological justifications for life 
                                                                                                     
Normative Retroactivity, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 485, 491 (2017) (arguing that 
retroactivity “should relate directly to the normative impact of the new rule on 
previous guilt and sentencing determinations”). 
 193. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736 (2016) (giving the substantive rule 
retroactive effect and applying the rule to juvenile offenders). 
 194. See id. at 733 (displaying concern for mandatory life without parole 
sentences for juveniles). 
 195. Id. at 733–34 (internal citations omitted). 
 196. See id. at 734 (requiring the sentencing court to take the juvenile 
offender’s age into consideration before delivering a sentence); Berry, supra note 
192, at 513–14 (discussing the problem of desire for finality trumping the desire 
for fairness in criminal proceedings). 
 197. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734–36 (requiring courts to consider 
factors such as the defendant’s youth and other characteristics before sentencing). 
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without parole collapse in light of ‘the distinctive attributes of 
youth.’”198 
That then is the virtue of individualized consideration—to 
assess whether, in light of the evidence, a punishment remains 
justified with respect to the offender in the case.199 While a 
punishment might seem to fit a crime in the abstract, it may not 
always do so in practice.200 As such, sentencing courts must 
consider aggravating and mitigating evidence in determining the 
appropriate sentence for an offender.201 
The Court has made it clear that these principles apply to 
capital cases and juvenile life without parole cases.202 The 
remainder of the Article makes the case for extending this doctrine 
to all felony offenses.203 To understand the basis for shifting and 
expanding the doctrine, though, it is necessary to explore the 
theoretical underpinnings of individualized sentencing under the 
Eighth Amendment.204 
III. Theoretical Underpinnings of Individualized Sentencing 
Emerging from the Court’s cases, there are two important 
theoretical underpinnings to the concept of individualized 
                                                                                                     
 198. Id. at 734. 
 199. See id. at 736 (noting that the Court’s decision does not require 
resentencing the offenders, only reconsidering them for parole). 
 200. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978) (recognizing the importance 
of individualized sentencing in the criminal justice system). 
 201. See id. at 608 (discussing the constitutional requirement of considering 
mitigating factors in a capital case). 
 202. See id. (“To meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute 
must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors); Montgomery, 136 
S. Ct. at 736–37 (acknowledging that juvenile offenders sentenced to life in prison 
must be given the opportunity to prove they should receive parole). 
 203. See Anne Yantus, Sentence Creep: Increasing Penalties in Michigan and 
the Need for Sentencing Reform, 47 MICH. J.L. REFORM 645, 675 (2014) (noting 
that judges do not favor mandatory minimums because of the lack of 
individualized sentencing). 
 204. See Nishi Kumar, Note, Cruel, Unusual, and Completely Backwards: An 
Argument for Retroactive Application of the Eighth Amendment, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1331, 1346–47 (2015) (discussing the concepts of proportionality and “evolving 
standards of decency” underlying the Eighth Amendment). 
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sentencing: offender uniqueness and punishment differentness.205 
These two principles shadow the Court’s current limits on this 
concept under the Eighth Amendment.206 
A. Offender Uniqueness 
Much of the impetus behind individualized sentencing under 
the Eighth Amendment rests in the idea that individual offenders 
are, in certain and important ways, unique.207 A mandatory 
sentence cannot capture this uniqueness because the crime itself 
does not fully define the appropriate punishment.208 
The unique nature of the offender stems both from the crime 
itself and the personal characteristics of the offender.209 To be sure, 
preferring one purpose of punishment to another might give 
guidance in this context, but the Supreme Court, Congress, and 
the states have refused to do so.210 For instance, if the Court and/or 
                                                                                                     
 205. See Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 104 YALE L.J. 933, 935 (1995) (noting that the movement 
towards probation was based on the acknowledgment that each offender was 
unique). 
 206. See Emily W. Anderson, Note, “Not Ordinarily Relevant”: Bringing 
Family Responsibilities to the Federal Sentencing Table, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1501, 
1505 (2015) (noting that not requiring courts to impose the federal sentencing 
guidelines allows them to individualize sentences based on the offender’s 
characteristics and the nature of the crime). 
 207. See discussion supra Part I (discussing the shift in jurisprudence to 
considering the individual characteristics of a criminal offender when selecting 
the appropriate sentence). 
 208. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (“Consideration 
of both the offender and the offense in order to arrive at a just and appropriate 
sentence has been viewed as a progressive and humanizing development.”); 
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 602–03 (“[W]here sentencing discretion is granted, it 
generally has been agreed that the sentencing judge’s ‘possession of the fullest 
information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics’ 
is . . . ‘essential [to the] selection of an appropriate sentence.’”). 
 209. See Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender 
Characteristics in Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 277 (2005) 
(discussing the importance of the conduct of the offense and the characteristics of 
the offender in sentencing decision making). 
 210. See William W. Berry III, Discretion Without Guidance: The Need to Give 
Meaning to § 3553 After Booker and its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631, 661 (2008) 
(addressing the issue caused by failing to apply a primary purpose when 
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a legislature decided that just deserts retribution served as the 
only applicable purpose of punishment, the assessment of the 
offender at sentencing would extend only to the offender’s 
culpability in committing the crime and the extent of harm caused 
by the criminal act.211 The personal characteristics of the offender 
would be irrelevant unless they bore on the culpability of the 
offender.212  
By contrast, a focus on one or more utilitarian purposes of 
punishment might make the personal characteristics of the 
offender the focus of the relevant inquiry.213 If rehabilitation were 
the goal, the sentencing question would hinge on a determination 
of the time needed to rehabilitate in light of the defendant’s 
personal circumstances.214 Similarly, if the applicable goal were 
incapacitation, the sentencing question would relate to the future 
dangerousness of the offender.215 Likewise, if deterrence were the 
goal, the length of time needed to adequately deter others from 
committing the same crime would guide the analysis.216 
In light of the mix of retributive and utilitarian purposes of 
punishment, a number of concepts become relevant in considering 
                                                                                                     
sentencing criminal defendants). 
 211. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE 
SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 4 (2005) (“The desert rationale rests on 
the idea that the penal sanction should fairly reflect the degree of 
reprehensibleness . . . of the actor’s conduct.”). 
 212. See id. (“[H]ow severely a person is punished should depend on the 
degree of blameworthiness of his conduct.”). 
 213. See PHILIP PETTIT & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, NOT JUST DESERTS: A 
REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 52–53 (1992) (focusing on the idea that 
utilitarianism’s approach to maximizing societal happiness is unworkable 
because it is too individualized); Richard Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. 
L. REV. 67, 77 (2005) (defining a range of morally permissible punishments gives 
judges the flexibility to consider other factors in determining sentencing). 
 214. See PETTIT & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 213, at 46 (disagreeing with a 
rehabilitation approach to punishment but acknowledging that it requires 
consideration of individual characteristics). 
 215. See Frase, supra note 213, at 70–71 (“Judges are given very broad 
discretion to assess the degree of risk posed by the offender, diagnose the causes 
of that risk, assess whether those causes can effectively and safely be treated 
without incarceration”). 
 216. See id. at 71 (noting that deterrence requires the sentencing judge to 
assess the individual’s probability of reoffending and mandating a punishment to 
mitigate that risk). 
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the unique nature of each offender.217 At its core, this assessment 
weighs all relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances to 
determine the appropriate punishment for the individual.218 
The idea here is that each individual offender is unique and, 
as such, the sentencer should assess the offender’s specific 
circumstances.219 This assessment can begin with the crime 
itself.220 Every murder is not the same. Every rape is not the same. 
Every robbery is not the same. In each case, there may be 
characteristics of the crime committed that call for increasing the 
punishment because of their aggravating nature or alternatively, 
decreasing the punishment because of their mitigating nature.221  
The federal sentencing guidelines attempt to encapsulate as 
many of these kinds of factors, mostly aggravating and some 
mitigating, into their advisory guidelines.222 While not perfect, the 
federal guidelines attempt to chronicle and account for every 
relevant aggravating and mitigating factor.223 States with 
                                                                                                     
 217. See RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING 35 (2012) (discussing the 
modification of state sentencing systems to broaden judges’ discretion to make 
sentence adjustments based on the needs and risks of the offenders). 
 218. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (“Consideration of both the offender and 
the offense in order to arrive at a just and appropriate sentence has been viewed 
as a progressive and humanizing development.”); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 
604–05 (1978) (emphasizing the need to treat the defendant with a higher degree 
of uniqueness in capital cases); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) 
(noting that the trial court should have considered the defendant’s mental health 
issues and abusive family situation before sentencing him to life without parole). 
 219. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (emphasizing the need to consider both the 
offense and the character and propensities of the offender when sentencing). 
 220. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 475–75 (discussing the need for consideration of 
the circumstances of the offense in determining culpability of the actor). 
 221. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608 (“The limited range of mitigating 
circumstances which may be considered by the sentence under the Ohio statute 
is incompatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); Miller, 567 U.S. 
at 489 (“Graham, Roper, and our individualized sentencing decisions make clear 
that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating 
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalties for juveniles.”). 
 222. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key 
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1988) (“The 
Commission’s system  . . . looks to the offense charged to secure the ‘base offense 
level.’ It then modifies that level in light of several ‘real’ aggravating or mitigating 
factors, . . . several ‘real’ general adjustments . . . and several ‘real’ 
characteristics of the offender, related to past record.”). 
 223. See Frank O. Bowman III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing 
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guideline systems have attempted similar approaches, although 
certainly not attempting to be as factually exhaustive.224  
Even with a sentencing commission’s best efforts, it may not 
capture certain relevant factual nuances of a particular crime that 
may demand aggravation or mitigation.225 That is why 
consideration of such evidence by a sentencing judge or jury 
becomes so important in many criminal cases.226 The uniqueness 
of the crime committed and the circumstances by which the 
offender acted thus is often not captured in the context of the 
definition of the crime under the statute, even with additional 
factors added by sentencing guidelines.227 
The problem lies in the broad scope of the categories of crimes 
adopted.228 As discussed above, states have had difficulty defining, 
for instance, which crimes actually fall within the category of 
first-degree murder.229 Even limiting the scope of the category to 
premeditated murders does not solve the problem in light of the 
difficulty of applying the concept of premeditation to the crime.230 
                                                                                                     
Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1347 (2005) (noting 
that the listed aggravating factors pertain to the offense while the sentencer is 
restricted from considering certain offender-related mitigating factors). 
 224. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, 
and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1201–02 (2005) 
(discussing the variations in how state sentencing guidelines account for 
aggravating and mitigating factors). 
 225. See id. at 1199 (discussing the different approaches of state sentencing 
guidelines, including if the guidelines consider aggravated and mitigated 
sentences); Breyer, supra note 222, at 11–13 (noting that there is disagreement 
over whether the federal sentencing guidelines should have included more or 
fewer mitigating and aggravating factors associated with each offense). 
 226. See Bowman, supra note 223, at 1333–34 (arguing that the federal 
sentencing guidelines have strayed too far from the judicial discretion which 
judges should be able to exercise in sentencing individuals). 
 227. See id. at 1326, 1333 (criticizing the sentencing guidelines’ restrictions 
on judicial discretion in imposing sentences). 
 228. See Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. 
L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1987) (listing crimes that are very broad in scope and advocating 
to narrow these crimes into subcategories). 
 229. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 291 (1976) (“[A]morphous 
nature of the controlling concepts of willfulness, deliberateness, and 
premeditation.”); Frase, supra note 224, at 1191 (noting that state sentencing 
guidelines vary in many ways, including in their scope of coverage). 
 230. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1971) (acknowledging 
that the legislative reform which changed first degree murder to include only 
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A category like felony murder makes it even worse—a wide variety 
of factual circumstances can exist under this category, many of 
which exhibit widely different levels of offender intent and 
culpability.231 As such, these categories do not really successfully 
group similar cases.232 Instead, they put the same label on different 
crimes that merit different levels of punishment.233 Without a 
judge or jury examining the case, the category can create 
sentencing outcomes that are disproportionate.234 
In many jurisdictions, there are no guidelines.235 The broad 
and overlapping nature of criminal statutes in this context merely 
exacerbates the problem.236 In such jurisdictions, the need for some 
                                                                                                     
those killings that were “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” was as 
unworkable as the concept of “malice aforethought”), vacated, Crampton v. Ohio, 
408 U.S. 941 (1977). 
 231. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291 (discussing “the inadequacy of 
distinguishing between murderers solely on the basis of legislative criteria” and 
states’ decision to shift to discretionary death penalty statutes); Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 (1982) (noting that a person can be convicted of felony 
murder even though he did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill the victim 
making the death penalty is an inappropriate punishment for this category of 
defendant); Guyora Binder et al., Capital Punishment of Unintentional Felony 
Murder, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1141, 1145 (2017) (“Felony murder liability often 
does not require proof of a culpable mental state with respect to the victim’s 
death.”). 
 232. See Binder et al., supra note 231, at 1147 (“[Felony murder] involves the 
same harm as other murder (death), but less culpability with respect to that harm 
(negligence rather than gross recklessness or intent). Nevertheless, it imposes a 
similarly severe penalty.”); Sara Taylor, Comment, Unlocking the Gates of 
Desolation Row, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1810, 1865 (2012) (“[M]otive and intent . . . are 
also relevant at the sentencing stage to differentiate between different grades of 
culpability with a particular offense.”). 
 233. See Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing 
Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 323, 343 (1992) (“A 
conclusion that a defendant is guilty, even of aggravated murder, does little to 
clarify the level of retribution that is warranted.”). 
 234. See Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 520 (2005) (arguing that judges and juries are the 
appropriate entities to weigh the malleable factors which determine 
proportionate sentences). 
 235. See Frase, supra note 224, at 1191 (analyzing the sentencing guidelines 
of eighteen states and the District of Columbia). 
 236. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505, 507 (2001) (“[V]irtually all scholarship in this 
field . . . consistently argues that existing criminal liability rules are too broad 
and ought to be narrowed.”); DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS 
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level of individualized consideration becomes paramount, as the 
categories of crime are insufficient to account for aggravating and 
mitigating facts that would indicate the need for a more serious or 
less serious punishment.237 
In light of the clear need for judicial or juridical inquiry into 
the uniqueness of the individual offender, it is worth examining 
what such an approach might look like in practice.238 At the very 
least, it warrants examination of both the offender and his 
criminal acts.239 
With respect to culpability, the sentencing body should 
evaluate the degree to which the offender is culpable for the 
crime.240 Certainly, this evaluation is part of the definition of the 
crime itself, with mens rea determining the level of offense in most 
cases.241 But the concept of culpability goes beyond mere intent; it 
instead encapsulates a broader notion of fault, guilt, and 
blameworthiness.242 The core question becomes how blameworthy 
is the individual for the criminal conduct at issue.243  
                                                                                                     
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 4–5 (2008) (examining data on the high rates of punishment 
and incarceration in the United States). 
 237. See Frase, supra note 224, at 1204 (noting that some state sentencing 
reforms have included individualized risk assessments for certain offenses). 
 238. See id. at 1333 (examining the history of the Federal Sentencing 
Commission trying to find a balance between judicial discretion and uniformity 
in sentences). 
 239. What may or may not be relevant might hinge upon the adopted purpose 
of punishment, but the states and federal government have not to date chosen to 
pursue one purpose over the others. See Berry, supra note 210, at 661 (noting that 
the central flaw in the criminal sentencing system is the “failure to adopt a 
primary principle by which to sentence criminal defendants”); Frase, supra note 
217, at 9 (discussing the widely recognized sentencing principles and their conflict 
with each other). 
 240. See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 211, at 20 (addressing the 
requirement that the sanction imposed reflect the offender’s degree of 
blameworthiness). 
 241. See Leslie Sebba, Is Mens Rea a Component of Perceived Offense 
Seriousness?, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 124, 126–27 (1980) (discussing the 
different levels of mens rea requirements in common law offenses).  
 242. See Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: III—The Rise and 
Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337, 404–05 (1989) (“[T]he 
predicate for all criminal liability is blameworthiness; it is the social stigma which 
a finding of guilt carries that distinguishes the criminal from all other 
sanctions.”). 
 243. See id. at 405 (arguing that blameworthiness is a necessary 
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Part of this analysis may include mitigating evidence related 
to the personal character of the offender.244 Courts may find 
victims of abuse, for example, less culpable for criminal conduct 
than non-victims.245 Likewise, youthful offenders might deserve 
some mitigation based on their lack of maturity.246 Other aspects 
                                                                                                     
determination in criminal law because social stigma is attached to a finding of 
blameworthiness). 
 244. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick & Douglas A. Berman, Towards a Theory 
of Mitigation, 96 B.U. L. REV. 161, 201–02 (2016) (discussing state sentencing 
statutes and practices that consider the character of the defendant and his 
likelihood to recidivate). 
 245. See Katherine I. Puzone, A Proposal to Allow the Presentation of 
Mitigation in Juvenile Court so that Juvenile Charges May Be Expunged in 
Appropriate Cases, 36 PACE L. REV. 558, 563 (2016) (“In many juvenile cases, 
abuse and mental illness are mitigating in the sense that they provide and 
explanation for the conduct rather than a legal excuse.”). This idea is not without 
controversy and has been the subject of multiple social science inquiries. See, e.g., 
Michelle E. Barnett, Stanley L. Brodsky & Cali Manning Davis, When Mitigation 
Evidence Makes a Difference: Effects of Psychological Mitigating Evidence on 
Sentencing Decisions in Capital Trials, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 751, 762 (2004) 
(finding that presenting evidence that the defendant suffered severe abuse as a 
child was more likely to lead to the recommendation of a life sentence rather than 
a death sentence compared to cases where no mitigating evidence was presented); 
Carolyn Smith & Terence P. Thornberry, The Relationship Between Childhood 
Maltreatment and Adolescent Involvement in Delinquency, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 451, 
470 (1995) (finding “childhood maltreatment is a significant risk factor for 
adolescent delinquency”); Michelle E. Barnett, Stanley L. Brodsky & J. Randall 
Price, Differential Impact of Mitigating Evidence in Capital Case Sentencing, 7 J. 
FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 39 (2008); Margaret C. Stevenson, Bette L. Bottoms & 
Shari S.S. Diamond, Jurors’ Discussions of a Defendant’s History of Child Abuse 
and Alcohol Abuse in Capital Sentencing Deliberations, 16 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, 
& L. 1, 1 (2010) (discussing that in sentencing, jurors can consider factors they 
would not have been able to consider when convicting the defendant, like the 
defendant’s history of child abuse); Craig Haney, Social Context of Capital 
Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 
562–63 (1995) (“[P]ersons accused and convicted of capital murder are very often 
the victims of poverty, and they have frequently been physically abused and 
chronically neglected as children.”). 
 246. Neuroscience increasingly supports this notion. See, e.g., Sara B. 
Johnson, Robert B. Blum & Jay N. Giedd, Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The 
Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. 
ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216, 216 (2009) (“[A]dolescent brain immaturity has been 
used to make the case that teens should be considered less culpable for crimes 
they commit.”); Laurence Steinburg, A Behavioral Scientist Looks at the Science 
of Adolescent Brain Development, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 160, 161 (2010) (finding 
the ages of fourteen to seventeen to be a period of “heightened vulnerability to 
risky behavior”). There may be limits, though, to its efficacy in juvenile justice. 
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of the personal background of the offender may also weigh in his 
favor, to the extent that they bear on the culpability of the 
offender.247 
Similarly, the mental condition of the offender may also bear 
on the question of culpability.248 Intellectually disabled offenders, 
for example, often bear less culpability than ordinary offenders 
particularly where their ability to comprehend the consequences of 
their actions or control their impulses becomes diminished.249 
In addition to the concept of culpability, the companion 
concept of remorse also can play a part in the assessment of the 
uniqueness of the offender.250 Jurors and judges alike may be 
inclined to decrease a criminal sentence where an individual 
offender exhibits remorse with respect to their criminal conduct.251 
While usually not diminishing the assessment of culpability, a 
                                                                                                     
See Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile 
Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 93 (2009) (arguing that developmental science 
studies will have a fairly modest effect on juvenile justice because “courts tend to 
regard even scientifically sound claims as legally irrelevant” and because 
scientific conclusions about youth as a class are “unhelpful in making highly 
individualized determinations”).  
 247. See Robinson, supra note 228, at 26–27 (advocating for the deration of 
other factors, like the defendant’s genuine remorse, along with traditional factors 
to determine sentencing). 
 248. See Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished 
Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 
827, 832 (1977) (noting court decisions that a defendant’s abnormal mental 
condition can be admitted to bear on the mens rea requirement of the charge). 
 249. Indeed, the Supreme Court has barred executions for intellectually 
disabled offenders. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“We are not 
persuaded the execution of mentally retarded criminals will measurable advance 
the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty.”); Hall v. Florida, 
572 U.S. 701, 708 1992 (2014) (“No legitimate penological purpose is served by 
executing a person with intellectual disability.”); Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 
1052–53 (2017) (“States have some flexibility but not ‘unfettered discretion’ in 
enforcing Atkins’ holding.”). 
 250. See Paul H. Robinson, Sean E. Jackowitz & Daniel M. Bartels, Extralegal 
Punishment Factors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hardship, Good Deeds, Apology, 
Remorse, and Other Such Discretionary Factors in Assessing Criminal 
Punishment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 737, 815 (2012) (finding the offender’s true remorse 
to be a mitigating factor according to respondents of the study). 
 251. See, e.g., Richard L. Lippke, Response to Tudor: Remorse-Based Sentence 
Reductions in Theory and Practice, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 259, 267 (2008) (discussing 
that some state officials may consider genuine remorse enough to reduce a 
sentence). 
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show of remorse indicates that some rehabilitation may have taken 
place or, at the very least, the offender has contemplated the 
consequences of his or her actions.252 
Having explored the ways in which offenders might be unique, 
one can start to understand the purpose for the Court’s use of this 
idea as part of its doctrine under the Eighth Amendment.253 The 
core concept relates to the importance of assessing the unique 
characteristics of the offender and his or her conduct.254 
B. Punishment Differentness 
In addition to the concept of unique offenders, the question of 
differentness permeates the Court’s application of its 
individualized sentencing construct under the Eighth 
Amendment.255 This principle allocates the use of the 
individualized sentencing determinations, constitutionally 
requiring such determinations in capital cases, and more recently 
in juvenile life without parole cases.256 
                                                                                                     
 252. See id. at 260 (“[T]he remorseful will do more than emotionally suffer in 
recognition of their misconduct; they will also seek to apologize, make amends or 
provide compensation, and resolve not to repeat the misconduct.”). 
 253. See Robinson, supra note 228, at 26 (arguing for a sentencing system that 
provides for genuine judicial discretion rather than pre-determined lists or grids). 
 254. See Anderson, supra note 206, at 1508 (noting that the Supreme Court 
declared mandatory sentencing guidelines unconstitutional because they lacked 
individualized tailoring to the defendant). 
 255. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (finding North 
Carolina’s death penalty statute unconstitutional, in part, because it did not allow 
for consideration of the particular characteristics of the offender); Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (finding Ohio’s death penalty statute unconstitutional 
because of the limited range of mitigating characteristics considered during 
sentences); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (considering that a 
defendant’s youth may make them less deserving of punishment than an adult). 
 256. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (emphasizing that the decision to impose 
the ultimate punishment of death cannot be made without consideration of an 
individual’s character); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608 (arguing that the Ohio death 
penalty statute allowing consideration of only three mitigating factors violated 
the Eighth Amendment); Miller, 567 U.S. at 489 (arguing that the imposition of 
a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile without consideration of mitigating 
factors violates the principle of proportionality). 
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As indicated above, the concept of differentness originated in 
the Court’s death penalty cases, with the Court adopting and 
reiterating the idea that “death is different.”257 The Court has 
identified death as different because it is the most severe 
punishment possible.258 It also has found death to be different 
because the death penalty, unlike other punishments, is 
irrevocable.259 Where one can release a wrongly convicted offender, 
such correction is impossible once the state has executed the 
offender.260 
For almost forty years, the Court drew a bright line based on 
differentness in its cases, separating capital from non-capital 
cases.261 In capital cases, the Court applied a much higher level of 
procedural scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment to assess the 
imposition of death sentences, with no similar scrutiny or analog 
in non-capital cases.262 In addition, the Court applied its evolving 
standards of decency doctrine to make substantive determinations 
about the scope of the Eighth Amendment.263 These included, as 
                                                                                                     
 257. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the origin of 
death-is-different jurisprudence). 
 258. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303–04 (“[D]eath is a punishment different 
from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree.”). Some might argue that life 
without parole is a worse outcome. See Berry, supra note 171, at 1054 (arguing 
that some see the death penalty as an anticipated end to suffering as opposed to 
life without parole). The large number of volunteers—death row inmates who 
waive their appeals and ask to be executed may substantiate this view. See Amy 
Smith, Not “Waiving” but Drowning: The Anatomy of Death Row Syndrome and 
Volunteering for Execution, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 237, 238 (2008) (calling this a 
“widely-recognized practice of volunteering for execution”).  
 259. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan’s 
opinion in Furman as the origin of the Court’s “death is different” capital 
jurisprudence). 
 260. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the origin of the 
idea that death is a wholly different kind of punishment for offenders). 
 261. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60–61 (2010) (noting that the Court 
has ruled that individuals convicted of nonhomicide crimes cannot be subject to 
the death penalty); Barkow, supra note 27, at 1146 (emphasizing that capital 
cases are treated differently than noncapital cases). 
 262. See Barkow, supra note 27, at 1146 (noting that courts take great care in 
ensuring a capital case sentence was not arbitrary and capricious but have done 
“virtually nothing” in noncapital cases to ensure the sentence is reasonable). 
 263. See id. at 1179 (arguing that evolving standards of decency may suggest 
treating capital and noncapital cases alike under the Eighth Amendment). 
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discussed above, establishing categorical limitations under the 
Constitution related to the imposition of the death penalty for 
certain crimes and certain types of offenders.264 
In non-capital cases, by contrast, the Court has not applied its 
evolving standards of decency doctrine, with one exception as 
explained below.265 Instead, the Court has adopted a test of gross 
disproportionality in non-capital cases to assess whether 
particular criminal sentences contravene the Eighth 
Amendment.266 In all of these cases but one, the Court has found 
the sentences imposed to be proportionate and thus acceptable 
under the Eighth Amendment.267  
Indeed, the Court has seldom held that a non-capital, 
non-juvenile life without parole sentence violated the Eighth 
Amendment.268 This is true even where the sentence seems 
particularly excessive. For instance, in Rummel v. Estelle,269 the 
Court affirmed a life-with-parole sentence for felony theft of 
$120.75 by false pretenses where defendant had two prior 
convictions.270 Similarly, in Hutto v. Davis,271 the Court upheld two 
consecutive sentences of twenty years for possession with intent to 
distribute and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana.272 In both 
                                                                                                     
 264. See id. at 1166 (discussing Justice Brennan’s argument that these 
evolving standards of society weigh against imposing the death penalty). 
 265. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 58 (acknowledging evolving standards of 
decency and finding that life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 266. See Barkow, supra note 27, at 1156–57 (noting that reviewing courts, as 
a threshold matter, must find the punishment grossly disproportionate to the 
crime, before engaging in further review). 
 267. Id. 
 268. On some level this is ironic given that the Court’s first two significant 
applications of the Eighth Amendment were in noncapital cases. See Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) (holding the punishment of cadena 
temporal (hard labor) unconstitutional in light of the offense committed); Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (holding removal of citizenship an 
unconstitutional punishment for desertion). 
 269. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
 270. See id. at 265–66 (“In 1964 the State of Texas charged Rummel with 
fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods or services. . . . In 
1969 the State of Texas charged Rummel with passing a forged check in the 
amount of $28.36 . . . .”). 
 271. 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam). 
 272. See id. at 374 (noting that “‘successful challenges to the proportionality 
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cases, the Court emphasized the principle of gross 
disproportionality as the standard for applying the Eighth 
Amendment to non-capital cases.273 
In Solem v. Helm,274 the Court appeared to find the possibility 
that some excessive noncapital sentences might violate the Eighth 
Amendment.275 In Solem, the Court reversed a sentence of 
life-without parole for presenting a no account check for $100, 
where defendant had six prior felony convictions.276 But the Court 
emphasized that Solem was an outlier soon after in Harmelin v. 
Michigan,277 a 5–4 decision. Harmelin affirmed a sentence of 
life-without-parole for first offense of possessing 672 grams of 
cocaine.278 Importantly, the Court in Harmelin rejected the 
application of the individualized sentencing to noncapital offenses: 
Petitioner’s “required mitigation” claim, like his proportionality 
claim, does find support in our death penalty jurisprudence. We 
have held that a capital sentence is cruel and unusual under the 
Eighth Amendment if it is imposed without an individualized 
determination that that punishment is “appropriate”—whether 
or not the sentence is “grossly disproportionate.”279 
Dicta in Harmelin further indicated that the Eighth 
Amendment really did not apply to noncapital cases except in the 
most extreme circumstances.280 
                                                                                                     
of particular sentences’ should be ‘exceedingly rare’”).  
 273. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265–66 (1980) (affirming punishment of life 
imprisonment and rejecting petitioner’s argument that such punishment was 
“grossly disproportionate” to his crimes); Hutto, 454 U.S. at 370–72 (1982) (per 
curiam) (affirming forty-year sentence and dismissing Davis’s habeas petition). 
 274. 463 U.S. 277, 279–84 (1983). 
 275. See id. at 284 (“The final clause [of the Eighth Amendment] prohibits not 
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the 
crime committed.”).   
 276. Id. at 279. 
 277. 501 U.S. 957, 961, 994, 996 (1991). Indeed, the Court in Harmelin 
backtracked, explaining that “[i]t should be apparent from the above discussion 
that our 5-to-4 decision eight years ago in Solem was scarcely the expression of 
clear and well accepted constitutional law.” Id. at 965.  
 278. Id.  
 279. Id. at 995. 
 280. See id. at 994–95 (“Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they 
are not unusual in the constitutional sense, having been employed in various 
forms throughout our Nation’s history.”). Justices Scalia and Rehnquist went 
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Two later cases reaffirmed the limited scope of the Eighth 
Amendment in noncapital cases, this time in the context of three 
strikes sentencing laws designed to enhance punishments for 
recidivists.281 In Lockyer v. Andrade,282 the Court affirmed on 
habeas review two consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to 
life for stealing approximately $150 of videotapes, where defendant 
had three prior felony convictions.283 Similarly, in Ewing v. 
California,284 the Court affirmed a sentence of twenty-five years to 
life for stealing approximately $1,200 of golf clubs, where 
defendant had four prior felony convictions.285  
The Court has blurred the capital/non-capital line of 
differentness more recently in two cases, Graham v. Florida286 and 
Miller v. Alabama.287 In these cases, the Court found that a second 
kind of differentness existed under the Eighth Amendment: 
juvenile offenders.288 Because “children are different too,” the 
Court created similar categorical limitations on the imposition of 
juvenile life without parole sentences.289 In Graham, the Court 
                                                                                                     
further, arguing that the Eighth Amendment did not contain any proportionality 
guarantee. Id. at 965 (“We conclude from this examination that Solem was simply 
wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee.”). 
 281. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (“The gross 
disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the 
extraordinary case.”); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (“Ewing’s is not 
‘the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the 
sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.’”). 
 282. 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
 283. See id. at 77 (holding that California’s application of its statute was not 
unreasonable). 
 284. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).  
 285. See id. at 30 (“Ewing’s sentence of 25 years to life in prison, imposed for 
the offense of felony grand theft under the three strikes law, is not grossly 
disproportionate and therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.”).  
 286. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 287. See id. at 82 (prohibiting the imposition of a life sentence without parole 
for minors who did not commit homicide). 
 288. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (“The two 14-year-old offenders 
in these cases were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.”). 
 289. See id. at 489 (holding mandatory-sentencing schemes requiring lifetime 
sentences without parole for all children convicted of homicide violative of the 
Eighth Amendment). 
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barred the imposition of life without parole in non-homicide 
cases.290 As discussed above, the Court in Miller barred mandatory 
juvenile life without parole sentences.291 
It is also worth noting that the Court made clear that 
Harmelin did not foreclose this expansion of the individualized 
sentencing concept beyond capital cases to non-capital (at least 
juvenile life without parole) cases.292 It distinguished Miller from 
Harmelin based on the differentness of juvenile offenders.293 
The move to embrace a second kind of differentness raises 
interesting questions about the notion of differentness itself.294 
With respect to death, the “different” category is a kind of 
punishment.295 By contrast, the “different” category with respect 
to juveniles relates to a type of offender.296 It is not clear what this 
distinction might mean for the future of the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  
One possible implication might be that death is more different, 
being a punishment, than juveniles, being a type of offender, and 
thus merits greater scrutiny and broader Eighth Amendment 
                                                                                                     
 290. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 74 (“This Court now holds that for a juvenile 
offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the 
sentence of life without parole.”). 
 291. See supra note 289 and accompanying text (differentiating juveniles 
from other offenders). The Court subsequently found that this determination was 
substantive, not procedural, and as such, applied retroactively. See Montgomery 
v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (“The Court now holds that Miller 
announced a substantive rule of constitutional law. . . . Giving Miller retroactive 
effect, moreover, does not require States to relitigate sentences, let alone 
convictions, in every case where a juvenile offender received mandatory life 
without parole.”). 
 292. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 482 (2012) (acknowledging that individualized 
sentencing is appropriate for children, as in noncapital cases). 
 293. Id. at 481 (“Harmelin had nothing to do with children and did not purport 
to apply its holding to the sentencing of juvenile offenders. . . . So if (as Harmelin 
recognized) ‘death is different,’ children are different too.”). 
 294. See Berry, supra note 171, at 1056 (exploring the “differentness” of 
sentencing juveniles in two contexts: first, the offenders are unique, and second, 
life without parole is a unique punishment). 
 295. Id. at 1070 (“While some have argued that LWOP is a harsher sentence, 
the Court has recognized on many occasions that the death penalty is the most 
severe punishment available.”).  
 296. See id. at 1073 (noting the distinct differences between adult and juvenile 
offenders). 
64 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 13 (2019) 
 
limits than juvenile life without parole.297 Another implication 
could be a willingness to examine other types of punishments as 
different, such as life without parole, or other categories of 
offenders as different, such as elderly offenders or veterans.298 
The real shortcoming of the differentness doctrine is that it 
has had the unfortunate secondary consequence of lowering the 
scrutiny given to non-capital cases (at least non-juvenile life 
without parole cases).299 The idea that capital cases require more 
constitutional scrutiny and as a result, more categorical 
limitations, does not justify the corollary conclusion that 
non-capital cases deserve less scrutiny.300 
Prior to Furman, the Court struck down two non-capital 
sentences, in the Weems301 and Trop302 cases, on the basis that 
those sentences were disproportionate. After the Court established 
that death was different, however, it largely refused to engage in 
similar analysis, raising the bar to an almost impossible to meet 
standard of gross disproportionality.303  
The effect of differentness has moved in two 
directions— raising the scrutiny for different punishments while 
lowering the scrutiny for non-different or “ordinary” 
                                                                                                     
 297. See id. at 1074 (“The idea is that, for juveniles, juvenile LWOP is 
essentially a death sentence and, as a result, such sentences should receive the 
same Eighth Amendment protections as the death penalty.”). 
 298. See id. at 1080 (examining other potential groups that could be different 
under the Eighth Amendment). 
 299. Slobogin, supra note 46 and accompanying text (noting an unintentional 
consequence of the Court’s differentness principle is that non-capital cases have 
received almost no constitutional scrutiny). 
 300. See William W. Berry III, Procedural Proportionality, 22 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 259, 271 (2015) (“In practice, the distinction between capital sentences and 
other death-in-custody sentences is often non-existent, with the vast majority of 
death row inmates dying of natural causes in prison, just like those serving LWOP 
sentences.”). 
 301. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) (holding the 
punishment of cadena temporal (hard labor) unconstitutional in light of the 
offense committed).  
 302. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (holding removal of 
citizenship an unconstitutional punishment for desertion). 
 303. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (“We conclude from 
this examination that Solem was simply wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains 
no proportionality guarantee.”). 
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punishments.304 The second effect has done more to deprive the 
Eighth Amendment of its power and protect the interests of 
individuals against overreaching state punishment than the 
enhanced differentness scrutiny has done to protect offenders from 
cruel and unusual punishments in capital and JLWOP cases. 
Just because the Court finds that the Eighth Amendment 
categorically prohibits certain kinds of capital cases does not mean 
that non-capital punishments are always constitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment.305 The lack of scrutiny and wide deference 
given to states in administering punishments is a testament to the 
need for constitutional oversight to eliminate the imposition of 
cruel and unusual punishments.306 
The differentness principle thus should not operate in two 
directions. It should raise constitutional scrutiny in “different” 
cases, but it should not serve to simultaneously remove the 
application of the Eighth Amendment in non-capital cases.  
Because criminal offenders are unique, and the Eighth 
Amendment applies to all criminal punishments, not just different 
ones, it should require individualized sentencing in all felony 
cases, not just death and juvenile life without parole cases. The 
next section advances this argument. 
IV. Expanding Individualized Sentencing to All Felonies 
In light of the Court’s holdings in its individualized sentencing 
cases, this Article argues for an expansion of these principles to all 
felony cases. Specifically, the seriousness of the deprivations 
warrants individualized consideration. 
In practice, this would mean that the Eighth Amendment 
would bar all mandatory sentences, including collateral 
                                                                                                     
 304. Id. at 1002 (contrasting the severity of the crime committed in Solem and 
the crime committed in the instant case). 
 305. See Barkow, supra note 27, at 1145 (“The Court will scrutinize whether 
the death sentence is proportionate to the crime and the defendant, and it has 
frequently exempted certain crimes and certain offenders from a capital sentence 
to avoid an unconstitutionally excessive punishment. The Court does not insist 
on any of these requirements in noncapital cases.”). 
 306. See generally William W. Berry III, Unusual Deference, 70 FLA. L. REV. 
315 (2018). 
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consequences in criminal cases imposed by statutory sections 
outside of the crime at issue. 
Under the Court’s current doctrine, states cannot impose 
mandatory death sentences307 or mandatory juvenile 
life-without-parole sentences.308 Doing so violates the Eighth 
Amendment because it denies the offender full consideration of the 
individualized circumstances of his crime and his character, 
including all relevant aggravating and mitigating evidence.309 
The differentness principle—for the death penalty and 
juveniles—has limited the application of the individualized 
sentencing constitutional requirement, even though the 
consequences of felony convictions themselves are quite serious. 
Framed in the language of the Court, death and juvenile life 
without parole sentences are both a kind of death sentence. But in 
the same way, a felony conviction and its many consequences can 
also have lifelong consequences, and essentially mandate the 
death of one’s “non-felony” self. It follows, then, that the Eighth 
Amendment requirement should flow to all serious consequences 
of criminal behavior. 
Note that the individualized sentencing requirement does not 
foreclose the imposition of a particular sentence. Woodson and 
Lockett do not proscribe death sentences;310 they simply require 
careful consideration of relevant information prior to imposition of 
a death sentence. Miller and Montgomery do not proscribe the 
imposition of juvenile life without parole sentences;311 they simply 
require careful consideration of relevant information prior to 
imposition of a juvenile life without parole sentence. 
A. The Case for Individualized Sentencing in All Felony Cases 
The Court’s individualized sentencing decisions emphasize the 
importance of having individualized sentencing consideration in 
large part because of what is at stake in the sentencing hearing. 
                                                                                                     
 307. Supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 308. Supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 309. Supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 310. Supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 311. Supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
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The capital cases, Woodson and Lockett, highlight the 
“differentness” of the death penalty as a basis for individualized 
sentencing determinations.312 If the state is seeking to kill someone 
as a punishment, the thinking goes, the sentencer should have a 
complete opportunity to examine all of the relevant evidence prior 
to making such a weighty decision. 
And in Miller, the Court similarly found that, at least for 
juvenile offenders, the seriousness of a life without parole 
sentence—a death in custody outcome—required individualized 
sentencing consideration.313 If the state is determining that an 
offender will be placed in prison and will never leave, the 
determination ought to include consideration of all relevant 
aggravating and mitigating evidence, and not flow automatically 
from the type of crime committed.  
1. The Seriousness of the Deprivation 
Modern felony convictions, while not approaching or 
mandating physical death, generate an emotional stigma and a 
series of collateral consequences that are likely to continue 
throughout an offender’s life.314 Indeed, receiving a felony 
conviction has the practical effect of changing the offender’s life 
forever, in a largely irrevocable way. 
While it is true that receiving a verdict of guilt or entering a 
plea of guilt may make an offender guilty of a felony, it does not 
follow that all felons should receive uniform consequences for their 
crimes.315 In fact, sentencing procedures, even in cases where 
mandatory minimum sentencing statutes apply, still determine 
the length of incarceration, at the very minimum. Sentencing 
hearings can also determine other details of punishment, 
beginning with the kind of facility in which the state shall 
                                                                                                     
 312. Supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 313. Supra notes 287–89 and accompanying text. 
 314. See infra note 326 and accompanying text (noting that a felony conviction 
can affect an individual’s right to vote, hold public office, and serve on a jury). 
 315. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 482 (2012) (acknowledging that 
individualized sentencing is appropriate for children, as in noncapital cases). 
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incarcerate the offender, the location of the facility, and the date 
when the sentence is to commence.  
With respect to these determinations, individualized 
sentencing considerations should apply. Mandatory outcomes in 
this context should violate the Eighth Amendment because they 
are life-altering decisions. Incarceration of any kind is a serious 
deprivation, such that a court should carefully consider its 
appropriateness in light of relevant aggravating and mitigating 
evidence. And if a court deems incarceration appropriate, the 
length of the sentence should not be an automatic product of the 
criminal offense; instead, it should likewise be the product of 
careful deliberation that weighs both aggravating and mitigating 
evidence. 
This is not to say that sentencing guidelines violate the Eighth 
Amendment.316 Providing guideline ranges for particular crimes to 
promote consistency in sentencing outcomes is fine, as long as such 
guidelines are advisory and allow for flexibility in engaging in 
individualized sentencing determinations.317 Requiring mandatory 
minimum sentences, to the extent one extends the individualized 
sentencing principle to all felony offenses, would deny a criminal 
offender the ability to use mitigating evidence to lower the 
sentence. This is the principle that the Court rejected with respect 
to the death penalty in Lockett.318 
To be sure, individualized sentencing does occur in many 
felony cases, but the inquiry lacks the same level of rigor that a 
capital sentencing procedure possesses. This is largely based on 
                                                                                                     
 316. After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005), and Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), however, mandatory sentencing guidelines do 
violate the Sixth Amendment because they serve to reallocate elements of a crime 
to criminal sentencing. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000) 
(holding unconstitutional a state hate crime statute which authorized an increase 
in maximum prison sentence based on judge’s finding by preponderance of 
evidence that defendant acted with purpose to intimidate victim based on 
particular characteristics of victim). 
 317. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (finding the provision of the federal 
sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory unconstitutional and 
modifying the statute to make the Guidelines advisor). “[The modified statute] 
requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges, but it permits the court 
to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well.” Id. (internal 
citations omitted).  
 318. Supra note 22 and accompanying text.   
INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING 69 
 
the tradition that has emerged from the differentness principle 
described above in Part II.  
Where this matters is in determining the length of the 
appropriate sentence. The United States incarcerates its criminal 
offenders at lengths and in volumes never before seen in the 
history of the world.319 The life without parole epidemic is 
particularly egregious. No other country in the world houses more 
than a few hundred inmates serving life without parole 
sentences.320 The U.S., by contrast, has over 2,500 inmates 
sentenced to die in prison.321 
Juvenile life without parole is another example. The United 
States is the only country in the world that permits the imposition 
of juvenile life without parole sentences.322 After Montgomery, the 
Court made clear that such sentences were disfavored; some 
states, however, persist in regularly imposing such sentences, and 
electing to simply reimpose the juvenile life without parole 
sentences mandatorily imposed but then reversed by Miller and 
Montgomery.  
Even with respect to other crimes, the United States imposes 
excessive sentences compared to most other Western countries. 
Drug cases provide another example of this over-punishment 
                                                                                                     
 319. See Criminal Justice Facts, SENT’G PROJECT, 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/criminal-justice-facts/ (last visited Mar. 20, 
2018) (showing the United States leading the world with over 600 individuals 
incarcerated per 100,000 compared to the next closest country, Rwanda, at a little 
over 400 individuals per 100,000) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 320. The European Court of Human Rights has held, in at least one case, that 
such sentences violate human rights. See Vinter & Others v. United Kingdom, 
Eur. Ct. H.R.  (2013) (“[I]n the majority of countries where a sentence of life 
imprisonment may be imposed, there exists a dedicated mechanism for reviewing 
the sentence after the prisoner has served a certain minimum period . . . .”); 
Ocalan v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014) (holding that a life sentence without the 
possibility of conditional release violated the European Convention on Human 
Rights). But see Hutchinson v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017) (“The Court 
concludes that the whole life sentence can now be regarded as reducible, in 
keeping with Article 3 of the Convention.”). 
 321. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (2018), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. 
 322. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (“We therefore hold that the Eighth 
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without 
possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” (emphasis added)).  
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phenomenon, but this is true across the board—the punishments 
are harsher in the United States on both a state and federal 
level.323 Promoting a more robust application of individualized 
sentencing principles, particularly mitigation evidence, might help 
to soften some of the criminal punishments imposed and help bring 
the United States more into line with the punishment practices of 
the rest of the world. 
In addition to mandatory minimum sentences, another place 
where mandatory sentence limits are imposed are through 
recidivist premiums. Three strikes laws are perhaps the most 
well-known of these mandatory requirements, but other recidivist 
premiums exist in both state and federal statutes. The idea is that 
the offender who repeats criminal conduct requires a greater 
punishment because they somehow knew better. A more legitimate 
rationale lies in the idea that the first punishment is a discounted 
sentence, and, as such, repeat offenders lose the right to enjoy this 
mitigation for second or third offenses. A more accurate 
understanding, however, is that the offender is simply being 
double punished for the first offense, which raises double jeopardy 
questions. 
At the very least, an extended individualized sentencing 
regime would proscribe the mandatory imposition of recidivist 
premiums. Arguably, though, an individualized sentencing 
approach would diminish or even exclude recidivist premiums 
altogether. To the extent that the prior offense somehow makes 
one more culpable during the second offense (or offers a basis to 
discount mitigating evidence), such evidence in theory might be 
relevant, but a more accurate sentencing would occur where courts 
do not consider such evidence with respect to the second offense. 
A second set of consequences—many of them collateral—often 
apply uniformly to all offenders within a jurisdiction, irrespective 
of whether those consequences are appropriate for the particular 
offender. These consequences can be far ranging in many different 
                                                                                                     
 323. See Berry, supra note 168, at 1060 (questioning whether society’s “view 
of proportionate punishment has evolved over time to conclude that LWOP 
sentences are excessive for certain crimes, particularly non-violent, victimless 
crimes,” such as drug offenses). 
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areas of life and continue after the offender has completed his 
incarceration.324 
For instance, offenders may be ineligible for public benefits. 
These may include the right to possess a drivers’ license, live in 
public housing, or receive welfare benefits.325 
A citizen may lose certain privileges of civil status, including 
the right to serve on a jury, hold office, and perhaps most 
importantly, the right to vote.326 Offenders typically also lose the 
right to own and carry firearms.327 Indeed, violating this rule can 
constitute its own separate criminal offense.328 
Some collateral consequences can also flow from particular 
offenses. Certain offenders, particularly sex offenders may face 
registration requirements.329 Such disclosure requirements may 
impede the ability to live in certain neighborhoods and 
communities.330 
Courts that have considered this issue have generally cabined 
such consequences as separate from the “punishment” imposed by 
the court at sentencing. This may be in part because a centralized 
uniform institution does not impose such consequences; a wide 
variety of institutions and administrative agencies may impose the 
collateral consequences. Further, there is not a uniform or 
collective set of statutes that impose these consequences; they 
extend across a number of federal, state, and local government 
statutes, ordinances, and regulations.  
                                                                                                     
 324. Infra note 326 and accompanying text. 
 325. See, e.g., Gabriel Chin, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 
18 CRIMINOLOGY, CRIM. JUST. L. & SOC’Y 1, 2 (2017) (“A conviction may make a 
person ineligible for public benefits, such as the ability to live in public housing 
or hold a driver-s license.”); Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 
88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1118 (2013) (examining the informal collateral 
consequences associated with criminal convictions, such as social stigma). 
 326. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 325, at 2 (“Some criminal convictions can lead 
to loss of civil status; a citizen may lose the right to vote, serve on a jury, or hold 
office . . . .”); Logan, supra note 325, at 1107 (“A criminal conviction often serves 
as a de facto informal basis for job denial, augmenting occupational bars . . . .”). 
 327. Id. at 3. 
 328. Id. 
 329. See id. (“Persons convicted of sex offenses often must register, may be 
excluded from living in particular areas, and are subject to post-incarceration civil 
commitment.”). 
 330. Id. 
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Under this thinking, courts have generally held that the 
consequences do not count as punishments for purposes of the 
Constitution, and thus cannot constitute cruel and unusual 
punishments.331 The Supreme Court, however, has not considered 
this issue. This is unsurprising given its long-held view that the 
Eighth Amendment really only has relevance for capital cases. 
Nonetheless, it seems disconnected from reality to suggest 
that these consequences are not punishments. Prohibiting a person 
from voting, owning a weapon, or receiving public benefits 
punishes them in a significant and tangible way.  
It is one thing for society to choose to impose such criminal 
sanctions on offenders after careful thought and deliberation in 
light of the offender and his criminal acts. It is something quite 
different to broadly assume that everyone that commits a 
particular crime categorically must be banned from a certain 
behavior or denied a certain right—often for an extended period of 
time. These consequences should be what judges are considering 
at sentencing, and what parole boards are considering at parole 
hearings.  
These consequences often operate in the shadows, but 
significantly affect the ability of criminal offenders to rejoin society 
in a productive and positive way. These consequences operate to 
punish offenders continually in many circumstances. In certain 
cases, these additional punishments can even promote 
recidivism.332  
The lack of centralized consideration of these deprivations as 
a collective package of punishments for offenders obscures the 
reality of the imposition of government power on its citizens. As 
such, the punishments do not adequately reflect the purposes of 
punishment with respect to the individual offender, and instead 
reflect a haphazard and often inexplicable set of limitations placed 
on the criminal offender.  
                                                                                                     
 331. Id. at 2 (“[C]ollateral consequences, the most significant part of the 
criminal justice system for many people, have generally not been considered 
punishment, and therefore are not subject to provisions of the Constitution 
regulating criminal proceedings.”). 
 332. Id. at 5 (questioning whether collateral consequences “frustrate public 
safety by denying some [convicted persons] a reasonable opportunity to lead 
law-abiding lives and not recidivate”).  
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Indeed, this approach to tagging offenders with a wide array 
of collateral consequences does not seem to advance the cause of 
society with respect to justice or safety. Rather, it impedes the 
reconnection of offenders to society and essentially creates a 
second class of citizens, regarded by the general public as a group 
to be avoided. 
The sentencing of criminal offenders would be much more 
justifiable, accurate, and sensible if the punishments imposed were 
clearly identified at sentencing, and considered carefully with 
respect to the offender, particularly in light of the criminal conduct 
of the offender, the character of the offender, and other relevant 
aggravating and mitigating evidence. 
2. The Dignity of Offenders 
Individualized sentencing likewise accords criminal offenders 
dignity in being able to receive a full evaluation of their criminal 
conduct as well as relevant aggravating and mitigating evidence 
prior to being sentenced. The offender has the opportunity to 
present evidence explaining, justifying, or otherwise 
contextualizing the criminal behavior at issue. This mitigating 
evidence can relate to the crime itself or to the criminal offender 
himself. 
Focusing carefully on the factual circumstances of the crime is 
critical to determining an accurate sentence. While some 
defendants may elect not to testify at trial, the ability of the 
defendant to speak to what happened at sentencing and provide 
his own version of the events in question is crucial to the court 
developing a complete understanding of the crime at issue. 
The characteristics of the offender often may bear on the 
appropriate punishment as well at sentencing. This is particularly 
true in American jurisdictions that predominately allow for all four 
main purposes of punishment—retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation—play a role in the sentencing 
process. Certainly, the mental health of the offender bears on the 
sentencing outcome, but so might other factors in the defendant’s 
past that bear on the defendant’s culpability, capacity for 
rehabilitation, or dangerousness. 
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It is important to recognize the reach of the constitutional 
doctrine developed in Woodson and Lockett.333 It does not mandate 
that the sentencer give any particular amount of weight to 
aggravating or mitigating evidence. Rather, it simply requires the 
sentencer to consider such evidence in determining the 
appropriate sentence.334 
But denying the offender consideration of such evidence, 
particularly mitigating evidence, strikes at the dignity of the 
offender. The idea here is that failing to consider one’s evidence in 
making a sentencing decision has a dehumanizing effect on the 
offender. Presuming that violating a statute mandates a particular 
result fails to account for the person of the offender.  
This Eighth Amendment principle of dignity derives from its 
early cases—Weems v. United States and Trop v. Dulles. As the 
Court in Dulles explained, “[t]he basic concept underlying the 
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”335 
3. The Meaning of Individualized Sentencing Consideration 
Individualized sentencing consideration does not mean that 
offenders receive lesser sentences. To the contrary, it means that 
a court will consider all of the relevant aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances in their case. This approach allows a court to 
achieve a level of accuracy in sentencing that mandatory statutes 
cannot. 
Statutes suffer from several problems in this context. First, it 
is almost impossible to define crimes in such a way as to both cover 
the correct conduct and sort the conduct appropriately. To be sure, 
it is difficult to define a crime in such a way that criminalizes all 
of the conduct that it should but does not criminalize innocuous 
conduct. Statutes suffer from both over-inclusive and 
                                                                                                     
 333. Supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 334. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (requiring individualized 
consideration of mitigating factors in capital cases). 
 335. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). See Meghan J. Ryan, Taking 
Dignity Seriously: Excavating the Backdrop of the Eighth Amendment, 2016 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 2129, 2131 (examining the sentencing limitations put in place by the 
Eighth Amendment, as well as its requirement of dignity in the punishment of 
convicted criminals). 
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under-inclusive problems in this sense. The wide variety of conduct 
that might fall under a given statute also means that two offenders 
convicted of the same crime might deserve vastly different 
sentences. This is obviously true with felony murder, as 
mentioned, but also can be true even with simple crimes. 
Likewise, the proliferation of criminal statutes that has 
resulted from two decades of penal populism means that the same 
conduct can violate a number of criminal statutes. The idea that 
statutes can appropriately sort offenders and successfully dictate 
a particular sentence or range of punishment thus seems to be 
inaccurate at best, futile at worst. 
Mandatory minimum statutes similarly assume that violators 
all deserve a minimum level of punishment, ignoring the 
possibility that mitigating circumstances in a given case might 
make such a sentence excessive. It is worth noting, in a world 
where 98% or more of the cases result in plea bargains,336 that the 
practical effect of mandatory minimums is not to ensure that the 
offender receives a minimum sentence for the conduct in question. 
Rather, it simply migrates the sentencing decision to the 
prosecutor who can choose to “sentence” the offender however he 
or she chooses by deciding which crime to charge the offender with 
in the plea. 
Individualized sentencing restores this role of sentencing to 
the judge or, in capital cases, the jury. In addition to increasing 
fairness in sentencing by having a neutral party determine the 
sentence, as opposed to the prosecutor who represents the 
government, restoring sentencing to judges increases 
transparency in sentencing. Sentencing hearings contain 
transcripts, a record of evidence, and a basis for appeal if the 
hearing contains improper bias or error.  
Prosecutorial decision making, by contrast, occurs in a black 
box of secrecy. Prosecutors enjoy a complete lack of accountability 
for their decisions with respect to pleas, and for the ways in which 
                                                                                                     
 336. See Criminal Cases—Summary Findings, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=23 (last visited Mar. 20, 2018) (noting 
that 95% of convictions worldwide in 2006 were the result of a guilty plea) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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they use mandatory sentences as a tool to convince offenders to 
plead guilty and, in doing so, set the sentence for the offender. 
The concern with plea bargains relates to the possibility, and 
even likelihood, that some offenders will plead guilty to crimes 
they did not commit. The risk of going to trial, and the subsequent 
trial penalty that often occurs at sentencing, both dissuade 
criminal defendants from rejecting plea offers, even when they are 
innocent. Prosecutors can offer a lesser sentence for deciding to 
plead guilty to a lesser offense than the potential sentence an 
offender might face if the offender went to trial being charged with 
the more serious offense.  
Studies also show that trials have the effect, in some cases, of 
increasing the sentence an offender receives at sentencing, beyond 
what a plea bargain might have offered for the same offense.337 
This trial premium, in essence, punishes offenders for forcing the 
prosecutor and the judge to go through the time and energy 
required at trial. 
Perhaps more troubling though is the idea that the opposing 
side in the trial—the prosecutor—gets to determine the sentencing 
outcome instead of the presumably neutral judge. Prosecutors 
should try cases, seek convictions, and zealously represent the 
interests of the state in punishing criminal offenders. But the 
prosecutor should not get to choose the punishment. A neutral 
third party, be it judge or jury, should have the sole power and 
authority to determine the criminal sentence. 
B. Roadblocks to Expansion 
The development of the Court’s doctrine as explained above 
has created several doctrinal roadblocks to the expansion of the 
concept of individualized sentencing beyond the death penalty and 
juvenile life without parole. Even so, these precedents are not 
airtight. If anything, the development of the Court’s doctrine, both 
in its willingness to abandon principles of stare decisis under the 
                                                                                                     
 337. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING 
RESEARCH SUMMARY (2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications 
/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf (finding that “[t]hose who go to trial 
rather than accept a plea are more likely to receive harsher sentences”). 
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Eighth Amendment and in its slow broadening of the idea of 
differentness, suggests that growth of individualized sentencing 
concepts is certainly possible.338 
1. Non-capital Bright-line (Differentness) 
As explained above, the Court for many years drew a 
bright-line distinction between non-capital and capital cases with 
respect to individualized sentencing.339 With the exception of 
Solem v. Helm, the Court consistently applied the Eighth 
Amendment individualizes sentencing principle exclusively to 
capital cases, and more recently juvenile life without parole 
cases.340 The Court has repeatedly rejected broadening the concept 
of individualized sentencing to noncapital cases involving adult 
offenders. As the Court explained in Harmelin, “But even where 
the difference is the greatest, it cannot be compared with death. 
We have drawn the line of required individualized sentencing at 
capital cases and see no basis for extending it further.”341 
It is not that the Court rejects the broad applicability of this 
principle. In Woodson and Lockett, it indicated as much, referring 
to individualized sentencing as sound policy.342 The Court’s 
historical view has been one of limited application of the Eighth 
Amendment, though, and as such, the Court has approached 
constitutionalizing the individualized sentencing concept beyond 
the death penalty with hesitancy.  
To be clear, the Court would have to overrule its prior cases to 
make such an expansion. Nonetheless, such an obstacle is not 
insurmountable. First, the Court’s decision to expand the concept 
of individualized sentencing to juvenile offenders in Miller and 
Montgomery demonstrates a lack of rigidity with respect to the 
formerly bright-line “death is different” distinction.343  
                                                                                                     
 338. With a less conservative Supreme Court, such a development might even 
be termed probable. 
 339. Barkow, supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 340. Supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
 341. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996. 
 342. Supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 343. Supra notes 291–92 and accompanying text. 
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A reorientation of the Court toward felony offenders would be 
necessary, but that is what has happened in recent years with 
juvenile offenders. Indeed, one can trace the development of this 
sentiment from Roper (2005) to Graham (2011) and Miller 
(2013).344  
The renewed focus on the mass incarceration problem in the 
United States could serve as an educational starting point for the 
Court to consider the real consequences of felony convictions. 
Certainly, as discussed above, the effects of such sentences can, in 
many cases, continue throughout the life of the offender, and as 
such, warrant careful consideration at sentencing as opposed to the 
imposition of mandatory, legislatively required outcomes.  
State legislatures have, in recent years, considered some 
reforms in this vein, at least with respect to lowering the sentences 
for low-level crimes or converting some felonies to 
misdemeanors.345 As the Court has explained, individualized 
sentencing consideration is a sound public policy.346 Using the 
Constitution to impose such a limit, however, would accelerate 
reforms and ensure a level of continuity with respect to criminal 
sentencing procedures. 
The differentness line, now breached by juvenile life without 
parole, is no longer sacrosanct. The values underlying the 
application of individualized sentencing to the death penalty and 
juvenile life without parole also apply to felony convictions. 
Particularly when one includes the collateral consequences, a 
felony conviction warrants the same kind of sentencing scrutiny 
that capital cases do, including a careful assessment of 
aggravating and mitigating evidence. What before was a bright 
line has now been muddied, and thus, opens the door for 
                                                                                                     
 344. Supra notes 286–90 and accompanying text. 
 345. See The Effects of Changing Felony Theft Thresholds, PEW (Apr. 12, 
2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2017/04/ 
the-effects-of-changing-felony-theft-thresholds (last visited Mar. 20, 2019) (“Since 
2000, at least 37 states have raised their felony theft thresholds, or the value of 
stolen money or goods above which prosecutors may charge theft offenses as 
felonies, rather than misdemeanors.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 346. Supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s 
decisions in Woodson v. North Carolina and Lockett v. Ohio). 
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reconsidering the location of the line, and perhaps the need for the 
line itself. 
2. Deference to States 
Aside from the precedents that impede the adoption of a 
constitutional requirement for individualized sentencing, the 
Court’s approach with respect to the Eighth Amendment also 
makes immediate adoption unlikely. While the Court’s approach 
with respect to other constitutional provisions—the First 
Amendment and the Fourth Amendment in particular—has been 
to decide a number of cases to delineate the scope of the 
constitutional right, its approach with respect to the Eighth 
Amendment has been largely to defer to states.347 
The dissenters in Furman provide an example of this.348 Both 
Justice Blackmun and Justice Powell indicated that they would 
vote against the death penalty if they were legislators, but viewed 
applying the Eighth Amendment as outside the scope of their 
judicial review power.349 Further contributing to this hesitancy 
might have been the backlash to the decision in Furman, with most 
states passing new statutes in response to the Court’s 
determination that the death penalty, as applied, violated the 
Eighth Amendment.350 
The judicial hesitancy has continued for decades. Three 
justices appointed by Republican presidents—Blackmun, Powell, 
and Stevens—all concluded that the death penalty was impossible 
                                                                                                     
 347. See generally Berry, supra note 306. 
 348. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 375 (1972). 
 349. See id. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Were I a legislator, I would 
vote against the death penalty for the policy reasons argued by counsel for the 
respective petitioners and expressed and adopted in the several opinions filed by 
the Justices who vote to reverse these judgments.”); see also id. at 418 (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (“In terms of the constitutional role of this Court, the impact of the 
majority’s ruling is all the greater because the decision encroaches upon an area 
squarely within the historic prerogative of the legislative branch—both state and 
federal—to protect the citizenry through the designation of penalties for 
prohibitable conduct.”). 
 350. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 
47 (2007) (“Within a day of the [Furman] decision, legislators in five states had 
announced their intent to enact new death penalty legislation and seventeen 
congressmen had joined in sponsoring a constitutional amendment to reinstate 
the death penalty.”). 
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to apply fairly and therefore was unconstitutional.351 None of the 
justices, however, chose to really do anything about this while they 
were on the Court. Stevens352 and Powell353 expressed their 
anti-death penalty sentiments in retirement, while Blackmun 
waited until his final term on the Court to reach his conclusion.354 
Currently, both Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg have 
expressed similar reservations.355 In Glossip v. Gross, Justice 
Breyer’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, catalogued 
all of the many problems with the death penalty and its arbitrary, 
unfair, and discriminatory application in the United States.356 
Despite all of the Court’s many concerns with the death 
penalty, the Court has been hesitant to use the Eighth Amendment 
to limit its imposition. Since 2002, the Court has identified several 
categorical limitations to the application of the death penalty.357 It 
has held that the Eighth Amendment proscribes death sentences 
                                                                                                     
 351. William W. Berry III, Repudiating Death, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
441, 441 (2011) (“In recent years, three Supreme Court Justices, Powell, 
Blackmun, and Stevens, have all called for the abolition of the death penalty, 
repudiating their prior approval of the use of capital punishment.”). 
 352. Id. at 443 (answering whether he would change his vote in any prior case 
affirmatively, saying “[y]es. I have come to think that capital punishment should 
be abolished”). 
 353. Id. (“I have relied on my own experience in reaching the conclusion that 
the imposition of the death penalty represents ‘the pointless and needless 
extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or 
public purposes.’”). 
 354. Id. (“[W]eeks before he retired from the Supreme Court in 1994, Justice 
Blackmun dissented to the denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins, and in doing 
so, wrote: . . . The basic question—does the system accurately and consistently 
determine which defendants ‘deserve’ to die?—cannot be answered in the 
affirmative.’). 
 355. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting, in a dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, that the death penalty 
suffers from “fundamental constitutional defects”). 
 356. See id. at 2756 (listing “(1) serious unreliability, (2) arbitrariness in 
application, and (3) unconscionably long delays that undermine the death 
penalty’s penological purpose”). 
 357. See supra Part I (providing an overview of Supreme Court decisions 
limiting the application of the death penalty).    
INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING 81 
 
for juvenile offenders,358 for intellectually disabled offenders,359 
and in child rape cases.360 As discussed above, it has also placed 
limitations on juvenile life without parole sentences, barring such 
sentences when imposed in a non-homicide case361 or as a 
mandatory sentence.362 
But these decisions have only provided a few categorical 
carve-outs; they have not robustly applied the Eighth Amendment 
to capital cases or juvenile life without parole cases, much less 
other non-capital punishments.363 Even the majoritarian nature of 
the evolving standards of decency test that the Court uses has not 
convinced the Court to intervene when states impose excessive 
punishments.364 The counter-majoritarian difficulty, the idea that 
five justices can undermine the will of the people by 
constitutionalizing a particular punishment in a particular 
situation, might ordinarily provide some occasion for choosing to 
defer to state punishment practices.365 Here, however, the 
constitutional test first analyzes the majoritarian practices of the 
                                                                                                     
 358. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who 
were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.”). 
 359. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in 
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punishment is excessive.”). 
 360. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446–47 (2008) (reasoning that 
“the [death] penalty must be reserved for the worst of crimes . . . for crimes that 
take the life of the victim”). 
 361. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (“This Court now holds 
that for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment 
forbids the sentence of life without parole.”). 
 362. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (reasoning that 
mandatory life sentences for juveniles run counter to the need for individualized 
sentencing). 
 363. See Berry, supra note 306, at 317 (analyzing several major Eighth 
Amendment decisions that reflect the Court’s failure to use the Eighth 
Amendment as a safeguard against excessive, arbitrary, or discriminatory 
criminal punishments). 
 364. See William W. Berry III, Evolved Standards, Evolving Justices?, 96 
WASH. U. L. REV. 104, 110 (2018) (arguing that while “society’s standards have 
evolved . . . the Court’s cases have not”). 
 365. See id. at 114–16 (discussing the various degrees of deference the Court 
provides to state practices).  
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state legislatures.366 Thus, the majority practice imposes a limit 
upon the scope of the Eighth Amendment, even though the 
provision is in theory counter-majoritarian in nature.367 As such, 
the Court should not feel any restraint in broadening the scope of 
the Eighth Amendment to limit outlier punishment practices.368 
Instead, the Court has chosen to defer to the states and their 
punishment practices, despite evidence that states often impose 
cruel and unusual punishments.369 The mass incarceration 
problem in the United States is in part attributable to the number 
of excessive sentences that states impose.370 
These occur on all ends of the punishment spectrum. The life 
without parole epidemic in the United States continues, with over 
50,000 inmates serving such sentences, many of who never had 
individualized sentencing consideration.371 The few other countries 
that impose such a sentence in the world all have several hundred 
prisoners at most serving such sentences.372 On the bottom end of 
the spectrum, states continue to convert misdemeanors into 
felonies, imposing relatively excessive punishments for minor 
crimes.373 While there has been some reform in recent years in this 
area, states still have an excess of criminal statutes374 and receive 
                                                                                                     
 366. See id. at 119 (asserting that the Court never fails to first examine 
majority trends before applying the evolving standards of decency doctrine).  
 367. See id. at 115 (“[N]one of these three majoritarian approaches create any 
meaningful counter-majoritarian difficulty. There is no concern about the justices 
overruling the practices of the states because they are only striking down minority 
jurisdictions.”). 
 368. See id. at 116 (“If the Court continues to use a majoritarian standard, the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty ceases to be an impediment in applying the Eighth 
Amendment to minority (and disproportionate) punishment practices.”). 
 369. See Berry, supra note 306, at 319–42 (surveying the deference shown by 
the Court to the states on questions of mandatory sentences, absolute and 
comparative proportionality, and racial discrimination). 
 370. See id. at 345 (suggesting that the Court “should consider claims of 
disproportionality in sentencing under the Eighth Amendment”). 
 371. See Berry, supra note 168, at 1055 (“[T]he number of LWOP sentences 
tripl[ed] from 12,453 in 1992 to over 41,000 [in 2015].”). 
 372. See id. at 1076 (“The nations with the next highest number of LWOP 
sentences . . . collectively have less than 150 offenders serving LWOP 
sentences.”). 
 373. See supra note 47 (giving examples of excessive punishments).  
 374. See HUSAK, supra note 236, at 9–10 (2008) (describing the difficulty in 
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no scrutiny with respect to the proportionality of the punishments 
they impose for a particular crime.375 
The Supreme Court’s habit of refusing to apply the Eighth 
Amendment to non-capital cases, particular those with excessive 
and disproportionate sentences, needs to change in order for felony 
offenders to enjoy individualized sentencing and full consideration 
of the relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances in their 
cases. While judges do consider such evidence in some cases,376 
implementing a constitutional requirement for such consideration 
would create uniformity in sentencing and restrict excessive 
prosecutorial power to sentence. 
3. Sentencing Disparities 
Another possible critique of extending the constitutional right 
to individualized sentencing in a broad way as this Article proposes 
relates to the likelihood of sentencing disparities. In light of the 
consideration at sentencing, different sentencers might allocate 
different weight to aggravating or mitigating evidence, and as such 
create disparate outcomes. 
This objection does not provide a real reason for denying 
offenders individualized sentencing consideration. First, most 
cases will involve a judge as a sentencer, not a jury.377 As such, 
there will at least be a modicum of consistency, in theory, within 
particular courts. Part of the concern with jury sentencing is that 
it is a “one-off”—jurors do not sentence case after case and thus 
have no barometer for determining what might be appropriate in 
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84 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 13 (2019) 
 
their case.378 Judges, by contrast, have the advantage of sentencing 
a series of cases, and can judge accordingly. Likewise, a major part 
of the role, in theory, of the judge in a criminal case is to determine 
the punishment. 
Further, to the extent that states have concerns about 
disparity, legislatures can promulgate advisory guidelines to help 
shape the decision-making of judges. While the Sixth Amendment 
prohibits mandatory guidelines,379 a series of flexible guidelines 
that allows for individualized sentencing consideration in the 
scope of a broader punishment scheme does not deprive the state 
of its power to guide criminal sentencing. Such an approach, 
though, also allows sentencing determinations to take into account 
the aggravating and mitigating evidence in the case of the 
offender, instead of imposing an automatic sentence. 
Equally important, keeping mandatory sentences does not 
ensure consistency in outcomes. Rather, it simply moves the 
discretion to the prosecutor’s office.380 Sentencing outcomes might 
appear to be more consistent, but those outcomes neglect the wide 
variation that occurs through the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, including whether to charge a case at all, and under 
what provision to charge the offender.381 Where there are 
mandatory sentences, the outcome becomes predictable. As such, 
the prosecutor has the power to essentially decide the sentence. 
Without mandatory sentences, the judge (or sometimes jury) 
maintains the power to sentence the offender in light of the 
aggravating and mitigating evidence proved at trial. 
                                                                                                     
 378. See id. at 987 (discussing the extent to which sentencing by judges is 
more uniform than sentencing by juries).  
 379. See supra note 316 and accompanying text (describing the effects of 
Booker and Apprendi on mandatory guidelines).  
 380. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (gathering sources discussing 
prosecutorial discretion in the context of mandatory minimums). 
 381. See, e.g., David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of 
Prosecutorial Discretion Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L. & ECON. 
591, 591 (2005) (documenting how prosecutors may use their discretion to 
circumvent mandatory minimums in certain circumstances); Jeffery T. Ulmer et 
al., Prosecutorial Discretion and the Imposition of Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences, 44 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 427, 427 (2007) (presenting various 
considerations affecting prosecutors’ decisions to pursue mandatory minimums). 
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4. Costs 
The cost increase of eliminating mandatory sentences would 
be de minimis. Even when defendants plead guilty, the court must 
hold some sort of sentencing hearing to impose the sentence.382 
Allowing individualized consideration in all felony cases might 
make hearings longer and more involved, but not in such a 
significant way, in most cases, to drastically alter the time spent. 
This is in large part because of the number of cases that end in 
plea bargains in the first place.383 
Even if the proposed approach increased criminal justice costs, 
such an approach would be worth it. The idea that the criminal 
justice system should deny offenders due process in order to save 
money contradicts the approach of most states and the protections 
offered by the Constitution in criminal cases. 
Further, imposing more accurate and offender-tailored 
offenses has a strong possibility of decreasing recidivism.384 An 
offender whose dignity is considered and who has a full and fair 
opportunity at sentencing to provide evidence may be more open to 
rehabilitation than an offender who simply receives a mandatory 
sentence and is unable to offer mitigating evidence.385 
Other possible savings might occur because sentences on the 
whole could be expected to be shorter.386 At least some of the cases 
would have mitigating evidence that warranted a sentence below 
what the mandatory minimum requires. As a result, the state 
would spend less money on incarceration on the whole if the 
                                                                                                     
 382. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (giving procedures required for pleas). 
 383. See Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2012, at A12 (“[Ninety-seven] percent of federal cases and 
94 percent of state cases end in plea bargains, with defendants pleading guilty in 
exchange for a lesser sentence.”). 
 384. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Perspectives on Police, 
Policing, and Mass Incarceration, 104 GEO. L.J. 1531, 1556 (2016) (making the 
case for imposing more carefully calibrated sentences as a means to reduce 
recidivism).   
 385. See Ryan, supra note 335, at 2176 (discussing the intersection of 
rehabilitation and offender dignity).  
 386. See Mary Price, Miller(ing) Mandatory Minimums: What Federal 
Lawmakers Should Take from Miller v. Alabama, 78 MO. L. REV. 1147, 1148 
(discussing the cost savings that result from proportionate sentencing).  
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Constitution required individualized sentencing determinations in 
every case. 
5. Stare Decisis 
Another factor further opens the door to the Court reversing 
its precedents in this area. Harmelin, one of the cases that would 
need to be reversed, discusses the limitations of stare decisis in 
this area in justifying its own overruling of Solem.387 In Justice 
Scalia’s Harmelin opinion, he explained: 
We have long recognized, of course, that the doctrine of stare 
decisis is less rigid in its application to constitutional 
precedents, see Payne v. Tennessee, ante at 501 U. S. 828; Smith 
v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 321 U. S. 665, and n. 10 
(1944); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 416 U. S. 
627-628 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Burnet v. Coronado Oil 
& Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 285 U. S. 406-408 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting), and we think that to be especially true of a 
constitutional precedent that is both recent and in apparent 
tension with other decisions.388 
It is not difficult to make the case that the decisions in Graham 
and Miller are in tension with Harmelin and other cases that limit 
the extension of the Eighth Amendment to noncapital cases. 
Justice Thomas’ dissent in Graham made this very point.389 To be 
sure, the recent shift away from the bright line between capital 
and noncapital cases suggests that other noncapital extensions of 
the Eighth Amendment might be both possible and reasonable. 
Just as Justice Scalia concluded that “Solem was simply wrong,”390 
the Court could conclude that refusing to apply the Eighth 
Amendment to noncapital cases is simply wrong. The Court’s early 
                                                                                                     
 387. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (explaining why the 
Court could “address anew, and in greater detail,” a “constitutional precedent that 
is both recent and in apparent tension with other decisions”).  
 388. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991). 
 389. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 103 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(pointing out the Court’s previous reticence to “crossing th[e] divide” with regard 
to the “‘death is different’ distinction”). 
 390. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965.  
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decisions in Weems and Trop, both of which reversed excessive 
noncapital sentences, lends support to this idea.391 
In addition to Harmelin and Solem, the Court has on two other 
occasions overruled Eighth Amendment precedents. In Atkins v. 
Virginia,392 the Court reversed its prior decision in Penry v. 
Lynaugh393 and held that intellectually disabled offenders were 
ineligible for the death penalty.394 Similarly, in Roper v. Simmons, 
the Court reversed its earlier decision in Stanford v. Kentucky395 
and held that the Eighth Amendment barred the execution of 
juvenile offenders.396 These cases indicate a willingness of the 
Court to reverse prior limits on the scope of the Eighth 
Amendment. 
V. Consequences of Broadening Individualized Sentencing  
Adopting the proposed expansion of the Eighth Amendment 
would have at least three important consequences: (1) giving 
defendants a day in court, (2) eliminating draconian mandatory 
sentencing practices, and (3) shifting back to a model of judicial 
sentencing from a model of prosecutorial sentencing. This section 
considers each of these virtues in turn. 
A. Giving Defendants a Day in Court 
At the core of our criminal justice system is the notion that the 
state cannot impose punishment on its citizens without due 
process of law. Part of this process includes the idea that a 
                                                                                                     
 391. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) (holding the 
punishment of cadena temporal (hard labor) unconstitutional in light of the 
offense committed); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (holding removal of 
citizenship an unconstitutional punishment for desertion). 
 392. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 393. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 394. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
 395. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 396. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2002) (“The Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under 
the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.”). 
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defendant deserves his day in court—an opportunity to go before 
the judge prior to the judge deciding the offender’s fate. Whether 
this opportunity will affect the outcome is in some sense beside the 
point. The issue is whether the accused can speak, or at least have 
an advocate speak, on his behalf in a court of law. 
This right is particularly important when the consequence for 
the offender is severe, which as the article has established, is every 
felony case.397 At the minimum, the opportunity to plead for the 
mercy of the court should be afforded to every criminal defendant.  
This is particularly true because the consequences continue 
for the remainder of the offender’s life in many cases.398 Denial of 
the ability to speak to these questions as a defendant 
fundamentally offends basic notions of due process. If a significant 
deprivation is to occur, one ought to have the opportunity to 
challenge the deprivation as to its character or its accuracy prior 
to its imposition. 
The denial of such a right not only undermines basic 
conceptions of due process, it also compromises the dignity of the 
offender.399 The automatic nature of mandatory sentences or 
non-litigated collateral consequences ignores the individual 
character of the offender and presumes a uniform connection 
between criminal act and consequence. While in most cases there 
must be some consequence, electing to ignore the details of the 
crime and the character of the offender exacerbates the possibility 
for injustice in individual cases. 
                                                                                                     
 397. See supra notes 31–40 and accompanying text (discussing the 
“dehumanizing effects” that result from felony convictions).  
 398. See, e.g., Pinard, supra note 31, at 459 (“[I]ndividuals must confront a 
wide range of collateral consequences stemming from their convictions, including 
ineligibility for federal welfare benefits, public housing, student loans, and 
employment opportunities, as well as various forms of civic exclusion, such as 
ineligibility for jury service and felon disenfranchisement.”); Kathleen M. 
Olivares, et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National 
Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION 10, 10 (1996) 
(“Upon release, incarcerated offenders often encounter barriers to successful 
reintegration involving stigma, loss of job opportunities, friendships, familial 
relationships, and denial of legal and civil rights.”). 
 399. See Ryan, supra note 335, at 2132 (“Eighth Amendment dignity means 
the individuality of an offender must be respected . . . .”). 
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Given that most cases result in a plea bargain, individualized 
sentencing determinations become increasingly important.400 
Although the defendant may forego a trial, sentencing remains an 
opportunity for the defendant to interact with the court in relation 
to his conduct. This is not just important for mitigation and the 
chance to reduce the sentence; it also provides an opportunity to 
express remorse and potentially accept responsibility for his 
criminal conduct. 
Mandatory sentences, however, thwart this process. If the 
minimum sentence is already decided prior to entering the court, 
the defendant’s day in court can becomes a mere formality. With a 
mandatory outcome, there is no consideration of the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances related to the offender and his 
actions. 
Historically, mandatory sentences have been fraught with 
jury nullification problems, particularly in the capital context as 
described earlier in the Article.401 Even where such nullification 
may not occur, it seems an impossible task to capture the 
consequence for every serious crime through a statutory scheme or 
even a sentencing guidelines scheme. Having a judge or jury 
actually consider the relevant evidence in making a punishment 
determination is highly preferable to mandatory line drawing. 
B. Eliminating Draconian Mandatory Sentencing Practices 
A second advantage of broadening the constitutional 
requirement for individualized sentencing to all felony crimes 
would be the elimination of mandatory minimum sentences. These 
sentences, often a vestige of the rise of penal populism in the 1980s 
and 1990s, impose draconian outcomes for minor offenses in many 
cases.402  
                                                                                                     
 400. See supra note 383 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of 
plea bargains). 
 401. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (tracing the Court’s long 
history of recognizing jury nullification).  
 402. See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice 
System— And What Can Be Done About It, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1429, 1431 (“In 
response to these increased crime rates, Congress and the state legislatures 
enacted laws that for most crimes imposed much higher sentences and greatly 
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These types of sentences are pervasive with respect to illegal 
drugs.403 Nonviolent first-time drug offenders often serve 
significant sentences (5 or more years) because of mandatory 
minimums.404 These sentences discourage rehabilitation and 
promote recidivism in addition to being clearly disproportionate.405 
Another area that such restrictions appear is as recidivist 
premiums. As discussed above, such minimum sentences are 
unfair because they punish an offender a second time for the first 
crime.406 While recidivism that encourages aggravation for repeat 
offenders, recidivism may be less likely where individualized 
sentencing determinations were made with respect to the initial 
sentence. 
The career offender and three strikes laws create the greatest 
possibility for injustice in this area. Such sentences punish based 
on cumulative effect, not based on the crime at issue.407 As a result, 
very minor felonies can receive quite harsh sentences, in some 
cases, mandatory life without parole. 
Such sentences often frustrate judges, who lose the flexibility 
to reduce such sentences when compelling mitigating evidence 
exists. This goes beyond simply being unfair at the margins. It 
imposes excessive sentences on individuals that might be better 
served with a warning or probation, and an opportunity for a 
second chance without the life-altering sentence that the statute 
requires. 
                                                                                                     
reduced judicial sentencing discretion.”).  
 403. See, e.g., JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., RAND, MANDATORY MINIMUM 
DRUG SENTENCES: THROWING AWAY THE KEY OR THE TAXPAYERS’ MONEY? XVI 
(1997) (concluding that mandatory minimum sentences are not justifiable on a 
cost-effectiveness basis in the context of certain drug crimes). 
 404. WILLIAM H. PRYOR ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF 
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10 
(2017) (describing the triggers and consequences for mandatory minimum 
penalties).  
 405. See Rakoff, supra note 402, at 1432 (discussing the disproportionately 
“huge sentences” that result from mandatory minimum sentencing regimes).  
 406. See Andrew D. Leipold, Recidivism, Incapacitation, and Criminal 
Sentencing Policy, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 536, 554 (2006) (suggesting that a 
significant number of recidivists will be “unfairly incapacitated because of 
recidivism fears”).  
 407. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY 
(2001). 
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C. Shifting Back to Judicial Sentencing from Prosecutorial 
Sentencing 
In addition to the problems with mandatory sentences discussed 
above, a final issue resolved by broadening individualized sentencing 
under the Constitution would be restoring the sentencing role to 
judges. As discussed, the practical effect of adopting mandatory 
sentences is to delegate the sentencing decision from the judge to the 
prosecutor through the plea-bargaining process.408 
If, on the other hand, mandatory sentences are unavailable, then 
the plea bargain will create a range of potential sentences, but the 
judge—or jury—will have the final say in crafting the punishment for 
the offender.409 This has been the model traditionally in the United 
States,410 and benefits from the transparency that comes with 
sentencing hearings in open court. Prosecutorial decision making is 
not subject to any review and is made in secret; judicial decision 
making is made in public and benefits from accountability.411 While 
this is clearly true at the state level, where judges are typically 
elected, research shows that this is also true for federal judges.412 
Indeed, although such judges enjoy life tenure, they also exhibit some 
concern for popular opinion in their decision making.413 
If states really want prosecutors to engage in criminal 
sentencing, they should restructure the criminal sentencing 
proceeding. Using mandatory sentencing practices that serve as de 
facto delegate sentencing compromises the broader aims of the 
criminal justice system and ultimately can threaten its legitimacy. 
                                                                                                     
 408. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (gathering sources discussing 
prosecutorial discretion in the context of mandatory minimums). 
 409. See Hoffman, supra note 377, at 953–55 (tracing the roles judge and jury 
play in the current sentencing process). 
 410. See Rakoff, supra note 402, at 1430–32 (tracing the development of plea 
bargaining, mandatory sentencing, and the role of the judge in criminal trials).  
 411. See id. at 1432 (noting the secrecy of prosecutorial decisions during the 
plea-bargaining process). 
 412. See Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1571, 1571 (discussing the tension between having a judiciary accountable 
to popular opinion and one unchecked by political preferences).  
 413. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 370 (2015) (“The 
accountability of the justices . .  . to the popular will has been established time 
and time again.”). 
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VI. Conclusion  
This Article has argued for the expansion of the Eighth 
Amendment’s individualized sentencing principle to all felony cases, 
including all relevant collateral consequences. While the Court 
currently adheres to the arbitrary bright-line rule limiting 
application of this principle to “different” cases (death penalty and 
juvenile life without parole), this article makes the case that such an 
extension is warranted and would improve the ability of the criminal 
justice system to achieve just and accurate sentencing outcomes. 
Viewed through the lens of the two core Eighth Amendment 
concepts—uniqueness and differentness—the Article demonstrated 
how such an expansion would be consistent with these theoretical 
underpinnings. It further showed how some possible roadblocks could 
be navigated, jurisprudentially and otherwise, to reach the intended 
doctrinal goal. 
Finally, the Article highlights three core benefits of adopting this 
reading of the Eighth Amendment: elimination of mandatory 
sentences, restoration of judicial sentencing, and allowing offenders 
to have the day in court that their dignity demands.  
